An empirical investigation of Barriga’s mediational model of moral cognition and antisocial behaviour: Moral reasoning recognition versus response generation assessments in models for general delinquency and sexually coercive behaviours by Gardiner, Sarah
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers 
9-19-2019 
An empirical investigation of Barriga’s mediational model of moral 
cognition and antisocial behaviour: Moral reasoning recognition 
versus response generation assessments in models for general 
delinquency and sexually coercive behaviours 
Sarah Gardiner 
University of Windsor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Gardiner, Sarah, "An empirical investigation of Barriga’s mediational model of moral cognition and 
antisocial behaviour: Moral reasoning recognition versus response generation assessments in models for 
general delinquency and sexually coercive behaviours" (2019). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 7808. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/7808 
This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor 
students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, 
in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, 
Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder 
(original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would 
require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or 
thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email 
(scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208. 
 
 
 
 
An empirical investigation of Barriga’s mediational model of moral cognition and 
antisocial behaviour: Moral reasoning recognition versus response generation 
assessments in models for general delinquency and sexually coercive behaviours. 
 
By 
Sarah Gardiner  
 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
through the Department of Psychology 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Master of Arts 
 at the University of Windsor 
 
 
Windsor, Ontario, Canada 
2019 
©  2019 Sarah Gardiner 
  
 
 
 
An empirical investigation of Barriga’s mediational model of moral cognition and 
antisocial behaviour: Moral reasoning recognition versus response generation 
assessments in models for general delinquency and sexually coercive behaviours 
by 
Sarah Gardiner 
APPROVED BY: 
______________________________________________ 
A. Fitzgerald 
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology 
 
______________________________________________ 
 L. Erdodi 
Department of Psychology  
 
______________________________________________ 
 C. Langton, Advisor 
Department of Psychology 
September 19, 2019 
 
 
MORAL COGNITIONS AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
iii  
 
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY 
 
I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis 
has been published or submitted for publication. 
I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon 
anyone’s copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, 
quotations, or any other material from the work of other people included in my thesis, 
published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard 
referencing practices. Furthermore, to the extent that I have included copyrighted material 
that surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within the meaning of the Canada Copyright Act, 
I certify that I have obtained a written permission from the copyright owner(s) to include 
such material(s) in my thesis and have included copies of such copyright clearances to my 
appendix.  
I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as 
approved by my thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has 
not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution. 
 
  
MORAL COGNITIONS AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
iv  
 
ABSTRACT 
In an attempt to understand how moral cognitions influence individual’s choices to 
engage in antisocial behaviours, Barriga et al. (2001) created a cognitive developmental 
model. The main goal of the present study was to replicate Barriga’s et al. (2001) updated 
model (Beerthuizen & Brugman, 2013) and extend their work by applying the model to 
sexually coercive behaviours. To investigate these associations, 123 participants 
completed online questionnaires that measured moral value evaluation, moral reasoning, 
moral identity, criminogenic cognitions and self-reported delinquent behaviours, 
including sexually coercive behaviours. Additionally, hostile attitudes towards 
men/women and desirable responding where measured and were used as control 
variables. Results showed that moral value evaluation was completely mediated by moral 
reasoning, more identity, and criminogenic cognitions. Additionally, criminogenic 
cognitions had a significant direct effect on deviant behaviours. The secondary goal of 
the current study was to gain insight into the concurrent validity of a relatively new 
recognition moral reasoning measure the SRM-SFO (Basinger et al., 2007) by comparing 
it to a well-established production moral reasoning measure the SRM-SF (Gibbs et al., 
1992). Results demonstrated a weak non-significant relation between the two moral 
reasoning measures.  
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
According to the 2017 Crime Severity Index, both volume and severity of police- 
reported crime in Canada has risen (Statistics Canada, 2017). In Ontario alone, 539 896 
Criminal Code violations (excluding traffic violations) were reported by police in the 
year 2017. Additionally, 141 799 adults (aged 18 years and over) and 12 847 youth (aged 
12 to 17) were charged with a criminal offense in Ontario (Statistics Canada, 2017), with 
women being accused of 23.7% of all Criminal Code violations (Statistics Canada, 2015).  
Notably, increases in the Crime Severity Index, in comparison to the last three 
years, have in part been due to increased rates of police reported sexual assault (Statistics 
Canada, 2017). However, sexual assault is a severely underreported crime, with 83% of 
all sexual assault incidences not being reported to police (Statistics Canada, 2014). 
Unsurprisingly, women make up the majority of sexual assault survivors, with nearly half 
of all female survivors (47%) being between 15- to 24-years-old (Statistics Canada, 
2014). This is in line with previous research which has found that 37.4% of female rape 
survivors were of university age at the time of the assault (Black et al., 2011). 
Additionally, Kerbs, Linquist, Warner, Fisher, & Martin, (2009) found that 19% of 
undergraduate women have experienced attempted or completed rape. However, men 
also experienced victimization, with 13% of self-reported sexual assaults being reported 
by men. Similar to women, young men (aged 15 to 24) had a higher rate of victimization 
when compared to older men (Statistics Canada, 2014). Thus, it appears that university 
aged individuals are at a higher risk for experiencing sexual coercive behaviours than 
their older counterparts.  
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In terms of perpetration, the majority of sexual assaults in 2014 were committed 
by men (94%), with 31% of male perpetrators identified as being university aged 
(between the ages of 18 and 24). Further, research on sexual assault on university 
campuses has demonstrated that 46% of male university participants report engaging in 
sexually coercive behaviours (Young, Desmarais, Baldwin, & Chandler, 2017). With 
regards to female perpetrators, 2.8% of all sexual assaults reported to police in the year 
2015 were committed by women. However, this number increases to 8% when self-
reported sexual assaults are considered, with 48% of sexual assaults against men being 
perpetrated by women (Statistics Canada, 2014). Thus, it appears that both the rates of 
perpetration and victimization are higher among adolescents and young adults. Given the 
prevalence of crime in society, it is no surprise that crime has long been an interest to 
researchers (e.g., Gluek & Gluek, 1940), and many have attempted to explain why 
individuals engage in deviant behaviours. 
 One such line of investigation has revolved around morality. More specifically, 
researchers have looked into moral reasoning (i.e., the reason individuals give for why an 
action is right or wrong; Kohlberg, 1981) and its relation to deviant behaviours in both 
offender samples (i.e. individuals who come into contact with the criminal justice system; 
see Stams et al., 2006) and non-offender samples (e.g., Cheng, 2014). The relation 
between moral reasoning and criminality rests on the assumption that moral reasoning 
influences moral action. That is, one’s moral development would be predictive of one’s 
moral behaviour. However, the relation between moral reasoning and deviant behaviour 
has not been so simplistic. As such, researchers have looked to other moral cognitions 
that may be predictive of antisocial behaviours. 
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In order to bridge the gap between moral reasoning and deviant behaviours, 
Barriga, Morrison, Liau, and Gibbs (2001) proposed a multi-process cognitive 
developmental model. The authors predicted that mature moral reasoning would 
influence the relative importance individuals place on moral characteristics (i.e., moral 
self-relevance) and that this would protect against individuals using self-serving biases 
that distort their perception of their actions. That is, individuals who demonstrate higher 
moral reasoning and moral self- relevance would not engage in the use of distorted 
beliefs and attitudes (i.e., self-serving cognitive distortions) that justify, minimize, or help 
them deny the impact of their immoral actions. 
To test their proposed model, the authors had males and females aged 16- to 19-
years old complete several self-report questionnaires that measured: personal 
competencies and problems, externalizing and internalizing behaviours, moral reasoning, 
moral self-relevance, and self-serving cognitive distortions.  Overall, the authors found 
support for their model. That is, mature moral reasoning and high moral self-relevance 
demonstrated a negative relation with self-serving cognitive distortions, which partially 
mediated the association between moral cognitions and antisocial behaviours. However, 
there was no relation found between moral reasoning and moral self-relevance and the 
relation between moral reasoning and deviant behaviours was found to only be 
marginally significant. Their results are in direct contrast to several studies which have 
demonstrated a link between moral reasoning and criminal behaviours (see Stams et al., 
2006 for meta-analysis). However, it is plausible that since the authors used a global 
measure of moral reasoning and not an individual’s moral reasoning related to the moral 
domain in which their transgression occurred (e.g., stealing involves moral reasoning in 
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the moral domain of property and law) the association between the two variables may not 
have been found due to these methodological choices. 
More recently, Beerthuizen and Bruggeman (2013) introduced an additional 
moral cognition into Barriga’s model. Specifically, the authors’ proposed the inclusion of 
moral value evaluation (i.e., the level of importance one assigns to certain moral issues). 
The authors believed that this quick and intuitive evaluation would be predictive of 
deviant behaviour, but would also be fully mediated by the three moral cognitions 
proposed by Barriga. In order to investigate the merit of including moral value evaluation 
into the model, the authors had 542 males and females between 11- to 18- year old 
complete several of the same self-report questionnaires utilized by Barriga et al. (2001). 
The authors found support for their hypotheses, with moral value evaluation influencing 
the three cognitive processes, which in turn influenced behaviour. Thus, the addition of 
moral value evaluation appears to be a useful contribution to Barriga’s et al. (2001) 
original model.  
As such, the primary goal of the current study was to replicate and extend 
Barriga’s updated model. First, updated measures that more accurately reflect the current 
literature on the moral cognitions of interest were utilized. In order to replicate the model, 
the relation between moral cognitions and general delinquency was investigated. To 
extend the model, the relation between moral cognitions and sexually coercive 
behaviours in both males and females were explored. Both university aged men (58%) 
and women (78%) have reported being on the receiving end of persistent attempts at 
sexual contact after they have refused said advancements (Struckman-Johnson, 
Struckman-Johnson, & Anderson, 2003). Additionally, both men (40% - 67.7%) and 
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women (26% - 49.5%) have engaged in tactics used to coerce a sexual partner into sexual 
activity (Schatzel-Murphy, Harris, Knight, & Milburn, 2009; Struckman-Johnson et al., 
2003). Thus, the high prevalence rate of both perpetration and victimization with regards 
to sexual coercion indicates that as a public health concern, this complex phenomenon 
warrants research. Additionally, as a unique class of delinquent behaviour, it represents 
an important opportunity to further investigate the links between moral reasoning in a 
specific domain with behavioural transgressions within that domain.    
A secondary goal of the current study was to examine the validity of a relatively 
new recognition moral reasoning measure (i.e., an individual must recognize a moral 
reasoning response among several provided options that best match their own reasoning). 
Generally, recognition measures have been found to lack sensitivity, as people are often 
able to recognize more morally mature responses than they are able to produce. However, 
given that recognition measures take less time to administer, score, and are less prone to 
coding errors, a psychometrically sound recognition measure would be advantageous for 
researchers. Thus, the current study compared a new recognition measure, the 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure –Short Form Objective (Basinger, Brugman, & Gibbs, 
2007) to a well-researched and psychometrically sound moral reasoning production 
measure (i.e., the individual must produce a moral reasoning response that reflects their 
own reasoning), the Sociomoral Reflection Measure – Short Form (Gibbs et al. 1992). 
Before a detailed description of the current study, the most relevant research will 
be reviewed. First, research examining moral reasoning and its relation to deviant 
outcomes, including sexually coercive behaviours, will be discussed. Next, moral identity 
and its relation with criminal behaviours will be examined, followed by the relevant 
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research on self-serving cognitive distortions and attitudes that are supportive of 
antisocial and sexually coercive behaviours. Following this, Barriga’s model will be 
reviewed, followed by an examination of the updated model proposed by Beerthuizen 
and Brugman (2013).  The current study along with hypotheses, results, and discussion 
will then be presented.  
Moral Reasoning 
Kohlberg’s six moral reasoning stages 
Kohlberg stressed that the relation between moral judgment and moral action was 
“complex and incompletely understood” (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987, p. 2) but he 
nonetheless argued that one’s moral development would be predictive of one’s moral 
behaviour. Kohlberg emphasized that this relation would not be ‘perfect’, as individuals 
at different moral stages may produce the same action while providing differing 
justifications. According to Kohlberg, moral development is a predictable progression 
through discrete universal developmental stages. As an individual acquires new cognitive 
skills through maturation and social role-taking opportunities, they advance to the next 
stage of moral reasoning. Each stage builds upon the last and requires more abstract and 
complex reasoning. Kohlberg organized his six stages into three levels, each 
incorporating two developmental stages:  
The “preconventional” (stages one and two), the “conventional” (stages three and four), 
and the “postconventional” (stage five and six).  
 The preconventional level.  The preconventional level consists of Stage 1 
(punishment and obedience orientation) and Stage 2 (instrumental relativist orientation). 
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Within this level moral values reside in the external. The individual responds to societal 
conceptualizations of good and bad, right or wrong but understands these labels in terms 
of punishment/reward or in terms of the authority of those who articulate these cultural 
rules/values. Children, young adolescents, and those who are frequently involved in 
criminal activities delinquents are typically thought to occupy this level of moral 
reasoning (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007).   
 The conventional level. The conventional level consists of Stage 3 (interpersonal 
concordance) and Stage 4 (law and order orientation) moral reasoning. Within this level, 
moral decisions are based upon the expectations of one’s community, social groups, or 
family. The individual has internalized these values and is loyal to, justifies, and actively 
maintains the moral order set out by their social systems, regardless of the “immediate 
and obvious outcomes” (Kohlberg, 1981, p.18). This level is typically achieved by older 
adolescents and adults (Gibbs et al., 2007). 
  The postconventional level. The postconventional level consists of Stage 5 
(social-contract legalistic orientation) and Stage 6 (universal-ethical-principal orientation) 
moral reasoning. Moral values have moved beyond societal norms and are self-chosen 
principles that are independent from individuals or authorities that uphold these values. 
The postconventional level represents “ideal” moral maturity and is only reached by a 
small subset of adults (Kohlberg & Higgins, 1984).  
Kohlberg’s work on moral development across the lifespan has been instrumental 
in furthering the understanding of moral reasoning. However, only the preconventional 
and conventional levels of moral reasoning have been found outside of Western cultures 
(Gibbs et al., 2007; Snarey, 1985). This culture-specific finding has prompted a critical 
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reformulation of Kohlberg’s stages, to which we turn to next. Even though the 
progression from immature to mature moral reasoning appears to be universally 
experienced (Gibbs et al., 2007) higher moral reasoning (i.e., stage four and above) may 
be dependent on the social and cultural opportunities present in a society.   
Gibbs’ sociomoral stage theory. 
In order to address this criticism of Kohlberg’s stage theory, Gibbs, Basinger, and 
Fuller (1992) proposed the Sociomoral Stage theory, a four-stage model of moral-
cognitive development. Given the relatively limited evidence supporting the existence of 
Kohlberg’s postconventional level (particularly in non-Western cultures; Gibbs et al., 
1992), Gibbs’ removed the postconventional stages (i.e., five and six) with the rationale 
that stages should be achieved through a natural progression that is independent of 
culture (Gibbs, 1979). Similar to Kohlberg, each level consists of two stages, with the 
first two stages representing immature moral judgment and the latter two stages 
representing mature judgement. Gibbs’ four stage model of moral reasoning has 
demonstrated cross-culture validity (Gibbs et al., 2007), and the four stages are as 
follows:  
Stage 1: Unilateral and Physicalistic. At this stage, individuals view morality in 
terms of authority and power, think in absolute terms, and have difficulty integrating 
different perspectives into their world view. There is a desire to appeal to authority (e.g., 
parent, God, law), with the acceptance that this higher authority determines what is right 
or wrong. Sociomoral justifications involve the immediate status of a person or object. 
For example, helping an adult because they are “big” or not stealing an object because it 
is expensive. These individuals have a simplistic understanding of moral labels (e.g., 
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good/bad, nice/mean) and understand moral values in terms of their physical 
consequences, with the belief that these consequences are inevitable.  
Stage 2: Exchanging and Instrumental. At this stage, sociomoral justifications 
are reflective of the perspective individuals gain from their social interactions. 
Justifications are viewed in terms of exchanges or a “tit-for-tat” standpoint under the 
anticipation of either positive or negative reciprocation. There is a basic understanding 
that all individuals are equal (e.g., “children are equal, so parents shouldn’t boss them 
around”, Gibbs et al., 1992, p. 24) and helping others is viewed as important. Sociomoral 
justifications are based on upholding people’s unfretted freedoms, consistency with the 
actor’s desires, the needs of oneself and others, and the calculation of practical 
(dis)advantages.   
Stage 3: Mutual and prosocial. At this stage, individual’s sociomoral 
justifications focus on interpersonal relationships, where empathy, societal norms, care, 
and intrapersonal approval are important factors. Individuals at this stage are genuinely 
concerned with the well-being of others and judge actions based on underlying intentions. 
It is important for these individuals to uphold their moral values in order to keep a “clean 
conscience” and feel good about themselves.  
Stage 4: Societal requirements. At this stage, sociomoral justifications are based 
on upholding the requirements of institutions and how decisions may impact society. 
Moral values, basic rights, societal responsibilities, social justice, and personal 
conscience are all elements that are considered in the decision-making process.  
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Moral Reasoning Measures: Production vs. Recognition 
 Historically, researchers have utilized two types of measures to assess theoretical 
models of moral reasoning. As briefly noted earlier, production measures require that the 
individual independently produce his or her own reasoning behind their moral judgments. 
In contrast, recognition measures task the individual with recognizing the moral 
reasoning statement among two or more options that best matches their own reasoning. 
Originally, the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) was the most 
prominently used production measure which assessed individuals on Kohlberg’s moral 
reasoning stages (Gibbs et al., 1992). Using ethical moral dilemmas, the MJI had 
individuals justify their reasoning behind their moral judgments of a dilemma. Thus, the 
moral judgment itself was not of interest, but the reasoning (i.e., moral reasoning) behind 
this judgment. Administrators of the approximately 30-minute interview needed to be 
sufficiently trained in interview techniques, conduct oral interviews, and transcribe said 
interviews (Gibbs et al., 1992). In order to score participants’ reasoning, researchers 
would have to learn an “intricate procedure”, which required the use of a several 
hundred-page scoring manual (Gibbs et al., 1992, p. 35). Thus, the administration and 
scoring of the MJI was rather difficult to master and a time-consuming process. 
 To address these limitations of the MJI, Gibbs et al. (1992) created the 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF) a relatively brief production 
measure used to assess Gibbs’ sociomoral reasoning stages. By removing ethical 
dilemmas and replacing them with more concrete moral questions, Gibbs et al. (1992) 
created a shorter (approximately 15 to 20 minutes), more straightforward moral reasoning 
measure that was developmentally appropriate for children as young as 10 (Gibbs et al., 
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1992). In the SRM-SF, participants are required to write down their own reasoning as to 
why they believe a certain moral concept is (or is not) important (e.g., “In general, how 
important is it for people to tell the truth? Why is that: very important/important/not 
important?”; Gibbs et al., 1992, p. 151). Researchers, must become well versed with the 
manual, then score each answer using the manual criteria to produce a Sociomoral 
Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS; see page 42 for detailed description of scoring 
procedure). The SRM-SF has demonstrated excellent reliability (test-retest, internal 
consistency, and interrater; Gibbs et al., 1992), validity (convergent, discriminant, and 
concurrent; Gibbs et al., 1992), and is a relatively brief production measure when 
compared to its predecessors (i.e., the MJI and the Sociomoral Reflection Measure; 
Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Gibbs & Widaman, 1982). Given its advantage, the SRM-SF 
has become a widely used moral reasoning measure within the literature (e.g., Brugman 
& Aleva, 2004; Chen & Howitt, 2007; Comunian & Gielen, 2000; Spenser, Betts, & Das 
Gupta, 2015). 
 However, given the qualitative nature of the SRM-SF, the measure does require a 
considerable amount of time to score and is susceptible to inter-rater disagreement and 
non-scorable answers. To address these concerns, Basinger, Brugman & Gibbs (2007) 
developed a recognition measure that closely mirrors the SRM-SF but provides 
participants with a selection of moral responses, each representing a different sociomoral 
stage in Gibbs’ moral reasoning model. Thus, the Sociomoral Reflection Measure- Short 
Form Objective (SRM-SFO) is a dilemma free recognition measure that assesses moral 
reasoning in a multiple-choice type format (see page 44 for detailed description of format 
and scoring procedure).  
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 It is not difficult to see how a quick-to-administer-and-score moral reasoning 
measure would be advantageous and of interest to moral researchers. However, 
recognition measures are not without their flaws. Perhaps the most glaring disadvantage 
of recognition measures is the possibility that individuals are able to identify (and thus 
select) higher levels of moral reasoning than they would be able to independently 
produce (Chen & Howitt, 2007; Gibbs et al., 1992). Indeed, recognition measures have 
been found to yield higher levels of moral reasoning in participants when compared to 
production measures (Brugman & Aleva, 2004; Gavaghan, Arnold, & Gibbs, 1983). This 
in turn may obscure potential significant differences between comparison groups, as the 
measure is not sensitive enough to incremental developmental changes in a participant’s 
moral reasoning (Beerthuizen et al., 2013). For example, a participant may be able to 
independently produce the reasoning that keeping a promise to a friend is important 
because friends “do things” for each other (a Stage 2 response) but upon reading the 
provided moral responses may recognize that a more morally mature answer would be 
that keeping a promise maintains trust within the friendship (a Stage 3 response). Thus, 
the participant may select the Stage 3 response even though a Stage 2 response is 
arguably more reflective of their current stage of moral development. This is important to 
note as, in this example, the transition between a Stage 2 response to a Stage 3 response 
is representative of the transition from immature moral reasoning (i.e., Stage 1 and 2) to 
mature moral reasoning (i.e., Stage 3 and 4). Thus, being unable to detect these subtle but 
key transitional periods may hinder the ability to detect significant group differences.  
  In an attempt to combat this issue, the SRM-SFO asks individuals to state 
whether each moral reasoning response is reflective of an answer they would produce and 
MORAL COGNITIONS AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
13  
 
to select which moral reasoning answer is the closest to their own reasoning. All answers 
that the individual considers relevant to themselves is then inputted into a mathematical 
equation (see page 44 for scoring breakdown). This is important to note, as individuals 
who select low maturity moral stages as well as high maturity stages will have a lower 
stage score than a participant who only selects more morally mature responses. 
Therefore, the SRM-SFO is a promising recognition measure that may have adequate 
sensitivity to subtle but important moral stage changes. Thus, a secondary goal of the 
current study was to investigate the validity of the SRM-SFO by comparing participant’s 
achieved moral stages in the SRM-SFO (i.e., recognition) with those found in the SRM-
SF (i.e., production).  
Moral Reasoning and Delinquency 
 Unsurprisingly, the development of Kohlberg’s cognitive-development moral 
reasoning model sparked interest in the relation between moral reasoning and immoral or 
delinquent behaviours. Although Kohlberg did not develop a theory of offending 
behaviours, he did suggest that criminality is due to a developmental delay in one’s moral 
reasoning (Kohlberg et al., 1975). He proposed that those who engaged in criminality 
were functioning at a preconventional level of moral reasoning, whereas typically 
developing adolescents and adults function at the conventional level (Kohlberg et al., 
1975). This is because the understanding and acceptance of societal values and rules (a 
core component of conventional moral reasoning) reduces the likelihood that an 
individual will engage in criminal activity. Palmer (2003) further developed the 
theoretical relation between moral reasoning and offending behaviour by suggesting that 
offending behaviours can be justified at all developmental stages of moral reasoning (see 
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Table 1 for Palmer’s justifications) but that these justifications are more likely to occur at 
earlier developmental stages. Similarly, Tarry and Emler (2007) acknowledge that 
although all stages of Kohlberg’s moral model can be used to justify illegal behaviours, it 
is Stage 2 specifically that allows for delinquent behaviours. This is because Stage 2 
moral reasoning is characterized by prioritizing one’s own personal needs, which allows 
for “self-serving antisocial behaviours that characterize delinquency” (Tarry & Emler, 
2007, p. 170).  
Table 1. 
Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Reasoning and Offender (Palmer, 2003) 
Stage 1 Offending is justified if punishment can be avoided 
Stage 2  Offending is justified is the gains/rewards outweigh the risk/costs 
Stage 3 Offending is justified if it helps to maintain relationships  
Stage 4 Offending is justified if it helps maintain society, or is sanctioned by a 
social institution 
Stage 5 Offending is justified if it maintains basic human rights or furthers social 
justice 
 
 The claim that lower stages of moral reasoning are linked with antisocial 
behaviours has been widely supported within the literature. For example, in a review of 
15 studies on individuals formally convicted within the criminal justice system and those 
without such involvement, Blasi (1980) found evidence consistent with the assertion that 
delinquents’ moral development was delayed. More specifically, Blasi found that the 
majority of offenders were reasoning at a preconventional level (i.e., stage 1 and stage 2), 
however, there was evidence of some higher levels of moral reasoning in some offenders, 
which suggests that although moral reasoning is a component of delinquent behaviour, 
other moral cognitions may be at play.  
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 A more recent meta-analysis conducted by Stams et al. (2006) reviewed 50 
published and unpublished studies examining the link between juvenile delinquency and 
delayed moral reasoning (k = 50, N = 4814). The authors found that offenders 
demonstrated lower levels of moral reasoning when compared to age-matched 
nonoffenders, with the largest effect sizes being found for males (d = .82), late 
adolescents (d = .78), and delinquents with lower levels of intelligence (d = .65). The 
authors concluded that even after controlling for age, gender, socioeconomic status, and 
intelligence, developmental delays in moral reasoning were strongly related to criminality 
in juveniles. These findings provide support for the theoretical understanding of 
delinquency being a potential consequence of delayed moral development and is 
consistent with previous research (Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1990).  
Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning and Delinquent Behaviours.  A large 
portion of research investigating the relation between delayed moral reasoning and 
delinquent behaviours has focused on males (e.g., Brugman & Aleva, 2004; Chen & 
Howitt, 2007; Palmer, 2003). However, given the higher prevalence of antisocial 
behaviours in the male population (Barriga, et al., 2001; Stams et al., 2006), this gender 
bias is not surprising. As previously discussed, the relation between delayed moral 
reasoning and antisociality has been well supported (see Stam et al., 2006). However, the 
literature on the relation between female deviant behaviour and moral reasoning has 
demonstrated some inconsistences. For instance, previous studies have found that a 
community sample of females demonstrate higher levels of moral reasoning (e.g., Palmer 
& Hollin, 1998), whereas others have found no gendered differences when investigating 
both a community and forensic sample (e.g., Barriga et al., 2001; Stams et al., 2006).  
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Additionally, the link between moral reasoning and deviant behaviours has not 
been consistently found in female samples.  For example, Beerthuizen, et al. (2013) 
found that a community sample of adolescent males demonstrated lower levels of moral 
reasoning than their female counterparts. Consequently, the negative relation between 
moral reasoning and self-reported delinquent behaviour was only present for adolescent 
males (11- to 17- year-olds). That is, the authors found no significant relation between 
moral reasoning and delinquent behaviour in their female sample. However, the sample 
may not have had enough older participants to adequately demonstrate the relation 
between moral reasoning and delinquency (Beerthuizen et al., 2013), as moral reasoning 
becomes especially relevant during the transition from preconventional to conventional 
moral reasoning (as typically happens during adolescents and early adulthood; see Stams 
et al., 2006). Therefore, it is possible that the lack of findings is due to the restricted 
number of older participants and not a lack of relation between moral development and 
antisocial behaviours in females. The current study attempted to addressed this 
methodological limitation by sampling an undergraduate university population that is 
often represented by young/emerging adults.  
In contrast to Beerthuizen et al., (2013), Gregg, Gibbs, and Basinger (1994) found 
that although females (both youths involved in the justice system and those recruited 
from the community) demonstrated higher levels of moral reasoning than males, moral 
reasoning was significantly lower for both male and female delinquents when compared 
to matched non-delinquents. Thus, it is possible that even though females exhibit higher 
levels of moral reasoning when compared to males, female delinquents (when compared 
to female non-delinquents) do demonstrate delayed moral development patterns similar to 
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their delinquent male counterparts. Given that females tend to engage in less criminality 
than males, it is possible that these inconsistences within the literature are due to sample 
size limitation. That is, the required sample size to find a significant effect of moral 
reasoning on delinquent behaviour for females may be larger than required for males.  
Although there has been substantial evidence supporting the relation between 
delayed moral reasoning and deviant behaviours (e.g., Chen, 2014; Chen & Howitt, 2007; 
Stam et al., 2006; Smetana, 1990), not all researchers have been convinced this 
association. In 2007, Tarry and Emler made the bold claim that moral reasoning is 
essentially irrelevant to delinquent behavioural outcomes. They argued that it is not a 
delay in moral reasoning that leads to offending behaviours, but an intense cynicism 
towards institutional authority and a deficit in moral values (i.e., social norms; see Emler 
& Reicher, 1995, 2005). More specifically, as children develop they become more aware 
of the inconsistences between the principals and practice of authority figures. These gaps 
are larger in some children’s experiences and can lead to resentment and cynicism 
towards social institutions. As children develop into adolescents, they form peer groups 
that exacerbate these attitudes, further distancing these adolescents from institutional 
authority (see Emler & Reicher, 1995, 2005 for more on the sociological-attitudinal 
model). Thus, it is not a developmental delay in moral reasoning that influences 
offending behaviours but attitudes towards authority and the rejection of societal norms 
set by these institutions.  
In order to test their claim, Tarry and Emler (2007) had boys aged 12 to 15 
recruited from a school in London, England, complete the Sociomoral Reflection 
Measure- Short Form (SRM-SF), a self-reported delinquency scale, and an attitude to 
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institutional authority scale. The authors found no significant correlation between 
participants’ moral reasoning and their self-reported delinquency. Nor did they find that 
moral reasoning was a significant predictor of delinquency. But moral values (i.e., moral 
value evaluation, as measured by the SRM-SF) and attitude towards authority 
significantly predicted self-reported delinquency. The authors concluded that attitudes 
and moral values, not moral reasoning, accounts for adolescents’ delinquent behaviours. 
Given the abundance of research on moral reasoning and delinquent behaviours, 
Tarry and Emler’s findings are surprising. However, there are several limitations of the 
study that should be noted. First, the study examined moral reasoning in a sample that is 
typically considered too young (i.e., 12- to 15-year-old), as moral reasoning is believed to 
not influence deviant behaviour until late adolescence (Brusten et al., 2007). Second, the 
authors’ self-report delinquency scale was scored using a frequency count and included 
relatively minor deviant behaviours (e.g., “purposely annoyed, insulted, or taunted 
strangers in the street”, p. 183). Thus, the most “serious” offenders may simply be 
engaging in fairly minor deviant acts. Finally, the authors only examined global 
differences in moral reasoning and did not investigate differences in specific moral 
domains, such as the moral domain of ‘property and law’ or ‘obeying the law’. This is an 
important distinction, as research has demonstrated that not all offenders display global 
moral reasoning deficits. For example, Smetana (1990) reviewed 35 studies that 
investigated the relation between moral reasoning and delinquent behaviours and noted 
that several of the studies reported stage 3 moral reasoning in a small subset of offenders. 
Additionally, Palmer and Hollin (1998) found that offenders are more likely to engage in 
lower levels of moral reasoning when the moral domain is directly related to their 
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committed offence. More specifically, offenders with property crime offences (e.g., theft) 
exhibited lower stage moral reasoning in the moral domain of property and law than in 
other moral domains, such as contract and truth. Thus, delays in moral reasoning may be 
specific to a particular moral domain and not a more global measure of moral reasoning. 
Moral Reasoning and Sexually Coercive Behaviours  
 Similar to those who commit general offences, it is assumed that those who 
engage in abusive sexual behaviours are operating at a lower stage in Kohlberg’s/Gibb’s 
model of moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 1992; Kohlberg, 1984). There has been limited 
research on the relation between moral reasoning and sexually coercive behaviours, with 
the vast majority of the literature focusing on incarcerated populations who have 
committed sex crimes. However, there is evidence to suggest that those who have been 
convicted of sexual offences do exhibit lower levels of moral reasoning when compared 
to non-offenders (Bernard, 2015; Buttel, 2002). Given that research on moral reasoning 
and general delinquency suggests that abusive sexual behaviours may be reasoning 
deficits in specific moral domains, a significant proportion of research on individuals 
who have been convicted of sexual offences has focused on domain-specific moral 
reasoning.  
 In order to investigate the potential influence of offender type (e.g., those who 
have been convicted of a sexual offence and those who were convicted of a non-sexual 
offence) and reasoning in specific moral domains, Ashkar and Kenny (2007) used the 
MJI to interview 16 incarcerated adolescent male offenders (7 with sexually based 
offences) aged 16 to 19 years old. Using moral dilemmas that involved either general 
delinquent behaviours (e.g., stealing) or abusive sexual behaviours (e.g., sexual assault), 
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the authors found those who committed sexual offences demonstrated lower levels of 
moral reasoning in the sexual offending dilemmas when compared to nonsexual 
offenders. Additionally, the authors found that those who were convicted of a sexual 
offence used more conventional moral reasoning (i.e., stage 3) in the nonsexual offending 
dilemma than those convicted of a nonsexual offence. The authors concluded that 
offenders’ moral deficits tend to be domain specific rather than an overall global moral 
reasoning deficit.  
 Similarly, Van Vugut et al. (2008) demonstrated that adolescent males who were 
convicted of a sexual offence exhibited lower stage moral reasoning when thinking about 
a sexual offence that concerned their own victim when compared to non-offending males’ 
moral reasoning in non-sexual moral domains. To assess moral judgment, the authors had 
20 males who were convicted of a sexual offence and 76 males recruited from the 
community, aged 13 to 19 years, complete the SRM-SF with questions added to address 
abusive sexual behaviours. Although domain specific differences were found in moral 
reasoning related to victim specific sexual offences, these differences were not found for 
general sexual situations that were not victim specific and no differences were found in 
non-sexual moral domains. It is important to note that the authors did not present the 
community male sample with the moral reasoning items related to the moral domain of 
love and sexual love (i.e., the items added to address abusive sexual behaviours). Thus, 
there was no information on the community male sample’s sexual moral development 
and whether their reasoning differed significantly from those who were convicted of a 
sexual offence. Nonetheless, the results provide some support that moral reasoning 
deficits may be domain specific and thus related to specific deviant behaviours.  
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 To further investigate whether deficits in the moral domain of love and sexual 
love are related to sexually coercive behaviours, Beerthuizen and Brugman (2012) had 24 
males who were convicted of a sexual offence and 24 males recruited from two 
community schools complete the SRM-SFO (with two additional items added to measure 
the moral domain of love and sexual love). The authors hypothesized that those convicted 
of a sexual offence would demonstrate lower levels of moral reasoning when compared 
to those who have not been convicted of a sexual offence only in the moral domain of 
love and sexual love and not in other non-sexual moral domains. This hypothesis was 
only partially supported, as results indicated that while those convicted of a sexual 
offence endorsed lower stage (i.e., preconventional) moral reasoning than those not 
convicted of an offence on sexual related issues, there was no difference in the 
endorsement of higher stage (i.e., conventional) moral reasoning between the two groups. 
Additionally, there was no differences in moral reasoning between the two group in non-
sexual moral domains. The findings provide further support that developmental delays in 
moral reasoning that lead to offending behaviours may be domain specific to the offense 
type. More specifically, that individuals who engage in sexually coercive behaviours 
demonstrate an endorsement of lower stage moral reasoning in the sexual moral domains 
but not in nonsexual moral domains. However, Beerthuizen and Brugman (2012) found 
that those who have been convicted of a sexual offence and those who have not both 
recognized morally mature responses in their moral reasoning on sexual issues.   
Given that the SRM-SFO is a recognition measure, it is possible that individuals 
convicted of a sexual offence were able to recognize morally mature responses even 
though these responses were not reflective of their own moral thinking. It should be 
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noted, that the scoring of the SRM-SFO has been recently revised to account for 
individuals’ ability to recognize more morally mature reasoning. As such, the current 
study utilized the revised scoring of the SRM-SFO (see page 44 for scoring details) for 
the further investigation of these issues.  
 The limited research on moral reasoning and abusive sexual behaviours is 
revealing. It appears that when specific moral domains are taken into consideration, 
individuals who engage in sexually coercive behaviours demonstrate delayed moral 
reasoning in the domain of love and sexual love. However, these moral deficits are not 
present when looking at other non-offence related moral domains. The relation between 
moral reasoning and sexually coercive behaviours has been largely studied in an offender 
population. It is unclear whether this relation translates to non-offender populations. It 
can be argued that sex offenders’ unique experience within the correctional system may 
place additional emphasis on punishment. As such, those convicted of sexual offences 
may focus on the personal consequences (a facet of preconventional moral reasoning) of 
committing sexual violence. Therefore, their immature moral reasoning within the 
domain of sex and sexual love may be related to extraneous variables not accounted for 
in previous research. For example, it has been proposed that adolescents who are 
involved in the criminal justice system have lower moral reasoning because of their 
institutionalization (e.g., Emler & Reicher, 1995) and poor moral atmosphere (Brugman 
et al., 2003; Brugman & Aleva, 2004). Thus, investigating this relation will provide 
insight into the role of moral reasoning on sexually coercive behaviours in a population 
that has not come into contact with the criminal justice system or at least is not recruited 
from that population. 
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Moral Identity and Antisocial Behaviours  
 According to Blasi’s (1983) self-model of moral functioning, individuals are 
motivated to seek out truth and experience reality in an accurate way. Individuals also 
seek out this truth in their self-concepts. That is, individuals seek experiences and make 
judgments that reflect their understanding of their “central” self. Individual’s sense of self 
may or may not incorporate “being moral” or behaving in a moral way. Additionally, 
people internalize different moral aspects (e.g., compassion, fairness, honesty, etc.)  to a 
different extent into their characterization of their central self. It is these individual 
differences that creates variance in moral behaviours between people (Blasi, 1983). This 
unique incorporation of moral characteristics into one’s core sense of self has been 
termed moral identity (Blasi, 1983). Since individuals desire to experience truth, humans 
are motivated to align actions and behaviours with their conceptualization of their central 
self. For example, if honesty is a highly relevant characteristic in an individual’s moral 
identity, this individual will likely not cheat on a test, even if the opportunity presents 
itself. This is because cheating would be in conflict with a core aspect of their identity. 
Cheating would induce negative affect and potentially require a restructuring of their core 
identity. Thus, people are highly motivated to behave in ways that are reflective of their 
central selves.  
 Given its theorized influence on behaviour, moral identity should be related to 
and predictive of moral actions. Accordingly, there has been evidence to suggest a 
relation between moral identity and prosocial behaviours (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; 
Hardy & Carlo, 2011). For example, moral identity has been associated with: self-
reported volunteering (Anquino & Reed, 2002), donation behaviours (Aquio & Reed, 
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2002), teacher-reported ethical behaviours (Arnold, 1993), and moral concern for out-
group members (Reed & Aquino, 2003).  
Given the apparent influence moral identity has on prosocial behaviour, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that moral identity may also influence deviant behaviour. 
Unfortunately, there has been limited research on moral identity and its influence on 
antisocial behaviours. One of the first papers to investigate the relation between moral 
identity and antisocial behaviours was Barriga et al. (2001). Barriga and colleagues 
(2001) looked at a facet of moral identity, referred to as moral self-relevance, which 
focuses exclusively on how individuals view certain moral characteristics as being a part 
of their sense of self. They found that moral self-relevance was negatively correlated with 
externalizing behaviours. That is, individuals who endorsed moral characteristics as being 
relevant to their sense of self were less likely to engage in deviant (e.g., rule breaking) 
and aggressive behaviours. More recent research has also found a correlation between 
moral identity and externalizing behaviours found by Barriga (Beerthuizen & Brugman, 
2013).   
 Although the role of moral identity on antisocial behaviour is limited to moral 
self-relevance, the past findings are promising. Thus, a goal of the current study was to 
replicate and extend Barriga et al.’s (2001) findings by employing an updated and more 
global measure of moral identity (i.e., The Self-Importance of Moral Identity Measure; 
Aquino & Reed, 2002), which has been widely used (Hardy, Dallas, & Olsen, 2015) to 
investigate the relation between moral identity and general delinquent behaviours. 
Additionally, the association between moral identity and sexually coercive behaviours 
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were also investigated; a focus that does not appear to have been considered in the peer-
reviewed published empirical literature to date.  
Criminogenic Cognitions and General Delinquency  
 Cognitive distortions occur when individuals attend to, and/or interpret 
experiences in inaccurate ways (Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, & Gibbs, 2000). These 
distortions bias individual’s interpretations of their world and can lead to attributing 
hostile intentions to others (Barriga et al., 2000) or viewing one’s self as helpless (Dodge, 
1993). However, these distortions can also serve a protective function, shielding 
individuals from negative self-concepts and self-blame. For example, an individual who 
physically assaults someone while inebriated may blame being intoxicated as the source 
of their assaultive behaviour and not reflective of their true self (i.e., their central self). 
This reduces the individual’s feelings of guilt, responsibility, and conflict, between their 
actions and their sense of self as a “good” person. Thus, self-serving cognitive distortions 
may reduce the negative emotions associated with performing antisocial and aggressive 
actions, leading individuals to engage in more deviant behaviours (Barriga et al., 2000; 
Barriga et al., 2001). 
 Self-serving cognitive distortions have been organized into four categories 
(Barriga et al., 2001, p. 536; Liau et al., 1998, p. 336): 
 1) Self-Centered: According status to one’s own views, expectations, needs, rights, 
immediate feelings, and desires to such an extent that legitimate views, etc., of 
others (or even one’s own long-term best interest) are scarcely considered or are 
disregarded altogether.  
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2) Blaming Others: Misattributing blame for one’s harmful actions to outside 
sources, especially to another person, a group, or a momentary aberration (one was 
drunk, high, in a bad mood, etc.); or misattributing blame for one’s victimization or 
other misfortune to innocent others.  
3) Minimizing/Mislabeling: Depicting antisocial behaviour as causing no real harm 
or as being acceptable or even admirable; or referring to others with belittling or 
dehumanizing labels. 
4) Assuming the Worst: Gratuitously attributing hostile attention to others, 
considering a worst-case scenario for a social situation as if it were inevitable, or 
assuming that improvement is impossible in one’s own or others’ behaviour.  
Indeed, researchers have found that individuals who engage in criminal acts 
endorse these cognitive distortions (Tangney et al., 2012; Tangney, Mashek, & Stuewig, 
2007). For example, in a university sample of 88 males and 151 females age 16 to 19 
years, Barriga et al. (2001) found that self-serving cognitive distortions were positively 
correlated with delinquent behaviours and that these distortions were significant 
predictors of said behaviours for both genders. Interestingly, the authors found that 
females used self-serving cognitive distortions to a lesser extent than males. Similarly, 
using a community sample of 542 males and females between the ages of 11 and 18 
years, Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) also found that higher cognitive distortions 
predicted higher levels of externalizing behaviours for both genders. These findings are 
consistent with the notion that individuals employ these self-serving cognitive distortions 
in order to justify their behaviours and minimize the disequilibrium between their actions 
and their sense of self as a “good person”. 
MORAL COGNITIONS AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
27  
 
  In order to measure these cognitive distortions both Barriga et al. (2001) and 
Beerthuizen and Bruguman (2013) used the How I Think Questionnaire (HIT), which is a 
self-report measure that assesses thinking distortions using the four-categories described 
above. It should be noted that the HIT Questionnaire (Barriga et al., 2001) relies heavily 
on behavioural contexts. Thus, it is possible that the relation between cognitive 
distortions and antisocial behaviours are inflated by this reliance on self-reported 
behaviours. That is, if measures of cognitive distortions are based upon asking an 
individual if they endorse certain behaviours and then similar externalizing behaviours 
are used as an outcome measure for delinquency, it is not surprising that these two 
variables would be highly correlated (Beerthuizen & Brugman, 2013). 
In addition to the self-serving thinking biases discussed above, researchers have 
proposed that offender attitudes (particularly those towards authority) also influence 
antisocial behaviours. Attitudes have long been discussed in the theories of crime as an 
important factor for why individuals engage in deviant behaviours (e.g., Glueck & 
Glueck, 1950).   
For example, Tarry and Emler (2007) found that negative attitudes towards 
institutional authority was correlated with delinquent behaviours. Similarly, using a 
school sample of 115 Australian males and females aged 13 to 15 years, Rigby, Mak, and 
Slee (1989) found that negative attitudes towards authority figures (i.e., parents and 
teachers) was predictive of self-reported antisocial behaviours for both genders. The 
authors found that attitudes did not significantly differ between the genders but male 
scores demonstrated greater variability overall. Thus, it appears that both self-serving 
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cognitive distortions and attitudes supportive of antisocial behaviours influence 
criminality.   
To address the limitation of heavy reliance of behavioural contexts to measure 
cognitions (i.e., the use of the HIT questionnaire) and the exclusion of attitudes within the 
Barringa et al. (2001) model, the current study measured not only self-serving cognitive 
distortions but attitudes that are supportive of antisocial behaviours. To achieve this goal, 
a measure of criminogenic cognitions was employed (i.e., the Criminogenic Cognitions 
Scale; Tangney et al., 2012). Criminogenic cognitions include beliefs and attitudes that 
offenders use to minimize and rationalize their behaviours. These beliefs and attitudes 
include key aspects of the self-serving cognitive distortions (i.e., notions of entitlement, 
failure to accept responsibility, and insensitivity  to the impact of the crime) measured by 
Barringa et al. (2001) model but extend the model by also including short-term 
orientation (e.g., “The future is unpredictable and there is no point planning for it”; 
Tangney et al. 2012, p.1343) and negative attitudes towards authority (e.g., “People in 
positions of authority generally take advantage of others”, p. 1343).  
Importantly, Tangney et al.’s (2012) self-report questionnaire uses attitudes to 
measure these criminogenic cognitions and does not rely on behavioural context. 
Tangney’s measure has demonstrated positive relations between criminogenic cognitions 
and antisocial behaviours (Tangney et al., 2012). By using a measure that relies on the 
endorsement of certain attitudes, one can be confident that the relation between criminal 
thinking and delinquent behaviours are not due to measure contamination. 
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Criminogenic Cognitions and Sexually Coercive Behaviours  
Just as criminogenic cognitions are believed to influence general deviant 
behaviours, these distortions in thinking have been linked to sexually coercive behaviours 
(Milner & Webster, 2007). That is, individuals who engage in sexually deviant 
behaviours hold attitudes and thinking distortions that allow them to justify, minimize, 
and deny the negative impacts of their behaviours. Attitudes that are supportive of 
sexually coercive behaviours help to protect the individual’s self-concept, potentially 
reducing negative feelings of guilt or shame. Polaschek and Ward (2002) identified a 
number of attitudes held by men who were sexually aggressive. These beliefs included 
attitudes that reflected a failure to accept responsibility for their own actions (i.e., male 
sex drive is uncontrollable), notions of entitlement and self-centeredness (i.e., 
entitlement), assuming the worst (i.e., women are dangerous, dangerous world), and 
minimization of the impact of the crime (i.e., women are sex objects). In order to further 
support Polaschek and Ward’s (2002) theory, Polaschek and Gannon (2004) interviewed 
37 men who were convicted of a sexual offence in order to obtain a self-report process 
description of their sexual offence. The authors found evidence for all of the attitudinal 
beliefs proposed. Additional research has also found the presence of these beliefs in men 
who have committed sexual murders (Beech, Fisher, & Ward, 2005). These findings 
suggest that those who are convicted of sexual offences engage in distorted thinking and 
hold attitudes supportive of sexually coercive behaviours.  
 More recent research has also supported Polaschek and Ward’s (2002) theory that 
these attitudinal beliefs (or criminogenic cognitions) are related to sexually aggressive 
behaviours. For example, Langton et al. (2008) found that minimization predicted sexual 
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recidivism in a subsample of 102 sexual offenders released to the community who did not 
receive further treatment after the completion of an initial custodial program. Further, 
Bouffard (2010) investigated entitlement in 325 sexually active male university students. 
The authors found that entitlement was positively correlated to measures of hostility 
towards women, adversarial heterosexual beliefs, and rape myths adherence. The authors 
also found that self-reported sexual entitlement and adversarial heterosexual beliefs were 
predictive of self-reported sexually aggressive behaviours. The authors concluded that the 
development of male sexual entitlement is particularly important in explaining and 
understanding sexually aggressive behaviours in a male sample. Thus, it appears that 
criminogenic cognitions may influence sexually deviant behaviours in both offender and 
non-offender samples. 
Although research on females who have been convicted of sexual offences is 
limited, there is evidence to suggest that similar to their male counterparts, sexually 
abusive females endorse attitudes that are supportive of sexually coercive behaviours. To 
explore this association, Gannon et al. (2012) interviewed 15 female convicted sexual 
offenders whose offences were committed against children. The interviews were then 
coded to see whether the female offenders endorsed any of the attitudes found in male 
sexual offenders. The authors found support to suggest that female sexual offenders also 
displayed criminogenic cognitions when discussing their crime. Interestingly, female 
offenders tended to not view their entire world as hostile (as male offenders tend to) but 
viewed males in particular as being dangerous and violent. Additionally, unlike male 
sexual offenders, females do not view themselves as being sexually entitled, but rather 
that men were entitled to act sexually against both women and children. Female sexual 
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offenders also viewed their perpetration of sexual abuse at relatively harmless, 
particularly when compared to sexual abuse perpetrated by males. These findings suggest 
that although women may employ self-serving cognitive distortions and attitude 
supportive of sexual coercive behaviours to justify and minimize deviant sexual acts, 
these beliefs may be distinct from those employed by male offenders. Nonetheless, it 
appears that criminogenic cognitions may influence female’s abusive sexual behaviours.  
As such, a goal of the current study was to go beyond Barringa’s model by not 
only examining criminogenic cognitions but also to examining how these beliefs are 
utilized by females who engage in sexually coercive behaviours. Such a link between 
criminogenic cognitions and sexually abusive acts perpetrated by a non-incarcerated 
female sample has yet to be investigated in the peer reviewed published empirical 
literature. Thus, the examination of this association between attitudes and behavioural 
outcomes in a non-offender female sample will be another novel contribution to the 
literature.  
Barriga et al.’s (2001) multi-process cognitive developmental model of delinquency 
Barriga et al. (2001) developed a cognitive developmental model with the 
intention to bridge the gap between moral reasoning and delinquent behaviours. The 
model proposed that moral reasoning would contribute to shaping one’s moral identity 
and that self-serving cognitive distortions would mediate the relation between moral 
reasoning and moral identity. That is, individuals with higher levels of moral reasoning 
and moral identity would be less likely to engage in self-serving cognitive distortions that 
justify immoral behaviours. This in turn, would constrain an individual’s engagement in 
deviant acts. These moral cognitions (i.e., moral reasoning, moral identity, and self-
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serving cognitive distortions) would also be predictive of deviant behaviours even when 
the other moral cognitions are considered.  
In order to test the model, both male and female university students (aged 16- to 
19-years old) were given several self-report questionnaires that measured delinquent 
behaviours (i.e., The Child Behaviour Checklist for Ages 4-18 and the Youth Self-Report 
Form), moral reasoning (i.e., the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form), moral 
self-relevance (i.e., the Adapted Good-Self Assessment) and self-serving cognitive 
distortions (i.e., the How I Think Questionnaire). As expected, the authors found that 
antisocial behaviour correlated negatively with mature moral reasoning and high moral 
self-relevance. Additionally, self-serving cognitive distortions were positively correlated 
with deviant behaviour. That is, individuals who demonstrated higher levels of distorted 
thinking were more likely to engage in delinquent acts. Interestingly, moral judgement 
was not correlated with moral self-relevance, which was contrary to the author’s original 
hypothesis (recall, the authors believed that mature moral reasoning would influence how 
relevant moral characteristics were to an individual’s sense of self). Nonetheless, moral 
reasoning, moral self-relevance, and self-serving cognitive distortions all significantly 
predicted deviant behaviours.  
To test their specific hypotheses regarding mediating relationships among the 
moral cognition variables and antisocial behaviours, the authors conducted a path 
analysis (see Figure 1). The authors found that self-serving cognitive distortions did 
partially mediate the relationship between moral judgement, moral self-relevance and 
deviant behaviours. The authors interpreted this to mean that mature moral reasoning and 
high moral self- relevance constrained deviant behaviour by discouraging the use of self-
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serving cognitive distortions. The authors also found that moral self-relevance and self-
serving cognitive distortions had direct significant effects on behaviour, whereas, moral 
reasoning was only marginally significant. Given that the authors used a single score of 
moral reasoning that included all moral domains and not those specific to the individual’s 
transgression, the relation between moral reasoning and behaviour outcomes may have 
been not been found due to methodology. The authors’ overall model accounted for 24% 
of the variance in behavioural outcomes with no gender differences in model fit between 
males and females. The authors also investigated gender differences on deviant 
behaviour, moral reasoning, moral self-relevance, and self-serving cognitive distortions. 
They found that males scored higher on deviant behaviours and self-serving cognitive 
distortions. Whereas, females scored higher than males on moral self-relevance. There 
were no gender differences on moral reasoning.  
 
Figure 1. Based on Barriga et al.’s (2001) path model, (p.549). 
Additionally, the authors ran ANCOVAs controlling for moral self-relevance and 
self-serving cognitive distortions. After controlling for the above variables, the authors 
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found no gender differences in antisocial behaviour between males and females. The 
authors suggested that gender differences in the perpetration of deviant acts may be 
explained by the variance between males and females in moral self-relevance and self-
serving cognitive distortions. This gender difference also helped to explain why some 
studies have shown that males and females have similar moral reasoning but that females 
engage in significantly less deviant behaviours. However, it is important to note that 
moral reasoning, self -relevance, and self-serving cognitive distortions predicted 
antisocial behaviour in a similar manner for both males and females within the sample. 
That is, both self-serving cognitive distortions and low moral self- relevance appear to be 
risk factors for engaging in antisocial behaviour for both men and women but males 
exhibit these risk factors to a greater degree. Overall, the authors concluded that moral 
cognition plays a unique role in predicting and explaining antisocial behaviour in both 
men and women.  
An Update on the Model: The Introduction of Moral Value Evaluation  
In 2013, Beerthuizen and Brugman proposed that Barriga’s moral cognition 
model was incomplete and that moral value evaluation should be included within the 
model. The authors defined moral value evaluation as the evaluation of the importance of 
certain morals. As such, the moral values in which people attribute more importance to 
will most likely be adhered to, with behaviours reflecting this adherence. The authors 
suggest that moral value evaluation is a quick, intuitive, and instinctual judgment that is 
later justified through one’s moral reasoning. Thus, moral value evaluation precedes all 
other moral cognitive processes. Therefore, the authors considered it an “influential 
elicitor” of the moral cognition process. 
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 In order to test their hypotheses, the authors used the measures utilized by 
Barriga et al. (2001) to measure moral identity and self-serving cognitive distortions. 
However, they used the SRM-SFO to measure both moral reasoning and moral value 
evaluation. The authors found that an increased attribution of importance to moral values 
was related to more mature moral reasoning, higher levels of moral identity, and a lower 
prevalence of self-serving cognitive distortions. In contrast to Barriga et al.’s (2001) 
findings, more mature moral reasoning was related to higher moral identity in females but 
not for males (recall that Barriga found no such relation). In order to investigate the 
mediating role of moral value evaluations through other cognitive processes, a path 
analysis was conducted (see Figure 2). The authors found that moral value evaluation had 
an indirect effect on deviant behaviour. That is, the effect of moral value evaluation was 
completely mediated by moral reasoning, moral identity, and self-serving cognitive 
distortions. Additionally, the authors found several gender differences that were not 
present in Barriga et al. (2001) sample. However, it should be noted the study was 
published in a book chapter and not a peer-reviewed journal, thus detailed statistical 
information was not included. Additionally, the authors used two separate samples (with 
one from a previous study), with slightly different operationalizations of moral identity 
and deviant behaviours used with each sample. Nonetheless, the authors’ hypothesis that 
moral value evaluation acts as an elicitor of stronger cognitive processes was supported 
and moral value evaluation appears to be a potentially important moral cognition. 
MORAL COGNITIONS AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
36  
 
 
Figure 2. Beerthuizen and Brugman’s path model. 
CHAPTER II PRESENT STUDY  
The main goal of the current study was to replicate and extend Barriga’s multi-
process cognitive developmental model. First, the study examined moral reasoning by 
specific moral domains rather than a single moral reasoning global measure (i.e., general 
delinquency and sexually coercive behaviours). Second, the study utilized a widely used 
and updated global measure of moral identity. Third, the study used a measure of 
criminogenic cognitions that does not rely on behavioural context. Fourth, the relatively 
new moral cognition, moral value evaluation (Beerthuizen, Brugman, Basinger, & Gibbs, 
2011) will be used.  Finally, in addition to testing a general delinquency model, as done 
by Barriga and colleagues, a second model will be tested to examine the associations 
between the four moral cognitions (i.e., moral value evaluation, moral reasoning, moral 
identity, and criminogenic cognitions) and sexually coercive behaviours. Importantly, 
these behaviours were investigated for both men and women. Generally, women are 
relatively understudied with regards to their involvement in delinquent behaviours. This 
is even more apparent when investigating women engaging in sexually coercive acts. 
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Thus, the test of this second model with a sample of women will be a novel contribution 
to the literature. 
The second goal of the study was to gain insight into the convergent, predictive, 
and concurrent validity of a relatively new recognition measure, the SRM – SFO 
(Basinger et al., 2007). In general, recognition moral reasoning measures produce higher 
scores of moral reasoning than production measures (i.e. SRM – SF; Gibbs et al., 1992), 
making them insensitive to smaller developmental changes in moral thinking. However, 
the SRM – SFO attempts to account for the ability to recognize more mature moral 
reasoning responses, making it a promising new measure. Thus, the current study 
compared the SRM – SFO to the SRM-SF (a well-studied and validated production moral 
reasoning measure; Gibbs et al., 1992).   
Hypotheses  
 A total of two models were tested: (1) a model testing associations with general 
delinquency using a combined male and female sample and (2) a model testing 
associations with sexually coercive behaviours using a combined male and female 
sample. In terms of the data analytic strategy, multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used to examine gender effects on 
the variables of interest. Bivariate and partial correlations were employed to test 
hypotheses 1 and 3, path analysis will be run for hypotheses 2 and 4, whereas correlation 
analyses will be conducted to test hypothesis 5.  
1. The first set of hypotheses is that Barriga et al. (2001) and Beerthuizen and 
Brugman (2013) findings will be replicated for general delinquency. That is, 
moral value evaluation, moral reasoning, moral identity, and criminogenic 
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cognitions would be significantly correlated with self-reported deviant 
behaviours. 
a. It is hypothesized that general delinquency will be negatively correlated 
with moral value evaluations, moral reasoning and moral identity. 
b. Next, it is hypothesized that general delinquency will be positively 
correlated with criminogenic cognitions. 
c. Further, it is hypothesized that criminogenic cognitions will correlate 
negatively with scores of moral value evaluation, moral reasoning and 
moral identity. 
2. The second set of hypotheses is that similar to Barringa et al. (2001) and 
Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) findings, moral cognitions will be significant 
predictors of general delinquency. 
a. It is hypothesized that moral reasoning will have a significant direct effect 
on general (see Figure 3). 
b. Further, it is hypothesized that both moral identity and criminogenic 
cognitions will be significant predictors of general delinquency (see 
Figure 4).   
c. It is hypothesized that moral value evaluation will have an indirect effect 
on general delinquency and be fully mediated through moral reasoning, 
moral identity, and criminogenic cognitions (see Figure 5). 
d. Next, it is hypothesized that criminogenic cognitions will mediate the 
relation between moral reasoning and general delinquency (see Figure 6). 
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e. Additionally, it is hypothesized that criminogenic cognitions will mediate 
the relation between moral identity and general delinquency (see Figure 
7). 
 
Figure 3. Proposed path model for hypothesis 2(a). 
 
Figure 4. Proposed path model for hypothesis 2(b). 
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Figure 5. Proposed path model for hypothesis 2(c).  
 
Figure 6. Proposed path model for hypothesis 2(d). 
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Figure 7. Proposed path model for hypothesis 2(e). 
3. The third set of hypotheses is that Barriga et al. (2001) and Beerthuizen and 
Brugman (2013) findings will be replicated for sexually coercive behaviours. That 
is, moral value evaluation, moral reasoning, moral identity, and criminogenic 
cognitions would be significantly correlated with self-reported sexually coercive 
behaviours. 
a. It is hypothesized that sexually coercive behaviours will be negatively 
correlated with moral value evaluations, moral reasoning and moral 
identity. 
b. Next, it is hypothesized that sexually coercive behaviours will be 
positively correlated with criminogenic cognitions. 
4. The fourth set of hypotheses is that similar to Barringa et al. (2001) and 
Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) findings, moral cognitions will be significant 
predictors of sexually coercive behaviours. 
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a. It is hypothesized that moral reasoning will have a significant direct effect 
on sexually coercive behaviours when the moral domain is specific to the 
delinquent behaviour. That is, immature moral reasoning in the moral 
domain of love and sexual love will be predictive of high rates of sexually 
coercive behaviours (see Figure 8).  
b. Further, it is hypothesized that both moral identity and criminogenic 
cognitions will be significant predictors of sexually coercive behaviours 
(see Figure 9).   
c. It is hypothesized that moral value evaluation will have an indirect effect 
on sexually coercive behaviours and be fully mediated through moral 
reasoning, moral identity, and criminogenic cognitions (see Figure 10). 
d. Next, it is hypothesized that criminogenic cognitions will mediate the 
relation between moral reasoning and sexually coercive behaviours (see 
Figure 11). 
e. Additionally, it is hypothesized that criminogenic cognitions will mediate 
the relation between moral identity and sexually coercive behaviours (see 
Figure 12). 
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Figure 8. Proposed path model for hypothesis 4(a). 
 
Figure 9. Proposed path model for hypothesis 4(b). 
 
Figure 10. Proposed path model for hypothesis 4(c). 
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Figure 11. Proposed path model for hypothesis 4(d). 
 
Figure 12. Proposed path model for hypothesis 4(e). 
5. The final set of hypotheses is that the SRM-SFO will be a valid measure of moral 
reasoning but will produce higher stage scores than the SRM-SF.  
a. It is hypothesized that the SRM-SFO and the SRM-SF will be positively 
correlated with each other.  
b. Next, it is hypothesized that the SRM-SFO will produce higher moral 
reasoning stages than the SRM-SF.  
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CHAPTER III METHOD 
Participants  
 The participants for this study were a total of 183 undergraduate students from the 
University of Windsor’s student online participant pool. Participants were awarded bonus 
course credit for their participation, which is in accordance with participant pool policy.  
 Participants who did not complete entire measures looking at the five variables of 
interest (i.e., moral value evaluation, moral reasoning, moral identity, criminogenic 
cognition and delinquent activities), were removed. Additionally, participants with three 
or more non-scorable responses on the SRM-SF were also removed from the analysis 
(Gibbs et al., 1992). The remaining sample consisted of 123 participants. Of the 
remaining participants 95 (77.2%) were female, 27 (22%) were male and 1 (0.8%) self-
identified as non-binary. Participants ages ranged from 18-years-old to 43-year-old, with 
the median age of the sample being 20-years-old (21.12%). The majority of participants 
self-identified as Caucasian (67.5%), were heterosexual (87.8%), and single (48%).  
Measures 
Delinquent Activities Scale (DAS; Reavy, Stein, Paiva, Quina, & Rossi, 2012). 
The Delinquent Activities Scale is a 37-item questionnaire that measures a wide range of 
delinquent behaviours such as: theft (e.g., “stolen [or tried to steal] something worth more 
than $50”), assault (e.g., “hit [or threated to hit] an adult.”), and illicit drug sale (e.g., 
“sold hard drugs such as heroin or LSD.”).  Participants are asked to indicate the age they 
first and last engaged in the delinquent activity, whether alcohol or marijuana use was 
involved, and whether they engaged in the delinquent behaviour 12 months prior to their 
most recent incarceration. The current study slightly modified the DAS to only ask 
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whether the participant had engaged in the delinquent behaviour and the frequency of 
said behaviour. Four additional questions were also added to the scale that are reflective 
of crimes typically committed by women (e.g., “made threatening or harassing phone 
calls”; Statistics Canada, 2017). The Delinquent Activities Scale has demonstrated to be 
reliable and have acceptable internal consistency (a = .75; Reavy et al., 2012).   
Postrefusal Sexual Persistence (Struckman-Johnson, Struckman-Johnson, & 
Anderson, 2003). The Postrefusal Sexual Persistence is a 19-item self-report measure 
which assesses the tactics individuals use in order to engage in sexual activity after the 
person with whom they wish to engage in sexual activity has already declined or rejected 
the sexual advance (Appendix B). Tactic types assessed include: sexual arousal (e.g., 
“persistent kissing and touching”), emotional manipulation and deception (e.g., 
“repeatedly asking”), exploitation of the intoxicated (e.g., “purposely getting a target 
drunk”), and physical force, threats, or harm (e.g., “using physical restraint”). Participants 
are asked to indicate whether they have or have not engaged in these tactics with a sexual 
partner since the age of 14 by selecting ‘yes’ or ‘no’. For scoring, responses of ‘yes’ are 
coded as 1 and responses of ‘no’ are coded as 0. Thus, scores ranged from 0 to 19, with 
higher scores representing higher levels of sexually coercive tactics use.   
Sociomoral Reflection Measure- Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992). 
The Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form is a moral reasoning production measure 
that requires individuals to independently produce their own responses to moral questions 
(Appendix C). The aim of the SRM-SF is to elicit moral reasoning by asking questions 
about moral topics such as keeping a promise or saving a life (e.g., “Think about when 
you’ve made a promise to a friend of yours. How important is it for people to keep 
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promises, if they can, to friends?”). Individuals must then rate on a 7-point Likert scale 
whether they believe each dilemma is “not important” to “very important” (i.e., the moral 
value component; Beerthuizen & Brugman, 2016). Participants are then asked to state 
their reasoning behind their choice (i.e., the moral reasoning component).  
 The SRM-SF comprises of 11 questions, which measure seven constructs: 
Contract, Truth, Affiliation, Life, Property, Law and Legal Justice. For the purpose of the 
current study, three questions from van Vugt et al. (2008) and one question from 
Beerthuizen and Brugman (2012) were added to measure participants reasoning in the 
moral domain of love and sexual love. These questions focus on sexual content and have 
demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability (Beerthuizen & Brugman, 2012; 
van Vugt et al., 2001). Thus, the SRM-SF comprised of 15 questions which measure 
eight moral domains.  
 In order to score the SRM-SF, participants’ moral justifications are compared to 
protocols in the SRM-SF handbook. Each question is coded according to the 
corresponding major moral stage, or transitional moral stage of Gibb’s sociomoral 
reasoning theory. For example, a ‘Stage 1’ response is coded as 1, whereas the 
transitional stage 1(2) is coded as a 1.5. All transitional scores are coded with a numerical 
value that is halfway between the stages that are represented in the transition. After all 
questions are scored, a summary score representing the participants overall level of moral 
reasoning is generated by calculating the arithmetic mean of all the scorable responses, 
this is referred to as the Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS). The SRMS is 
then multiplied by 100 for data-analytic purposes (Gibbs et al., 1992). Thus, scores range 
from 100 – 400. The SRMS score also corresponds to a Global Stage, which represents 
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the participants overall developmental stage. For example, an SRMS score of 275 would 
be representative of a Global Stage of 3. Table 2 presents SRMS scores and the 
corresponding Global Stage.  
 The SRM-SF has demonstrated excellent internal consistency (r = .92) and good 
test-retest reliability (r =.88; Gibbs et al., 1992). The SRM-SF has also demonstrated 
acceptable levels of concurrent validity with the Moral Judgment Interview (r =.69, p < 
.001; Gibbs et al., 1992), which is based upon Kohlberg’s six stage model (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987). Gibbs et al. (1992) reported no significant correlations between the 
SRM-SF and social desirability, however the social desirability measure used was not 
reported.  
Table 2. SRMS Score and Global Stage 
SRMS Score Range Global Stage 
100 - 125 Stage 1 
126 - 149 Transition Stage 1(2) 
150 - 174 Transition Stage 2(1) 
175 - 225 Stage 2 
226 - 249 Transition Stage 2(3) 
250 - 274 Transition Stage 3(2) 
275 - 325 Stage 3 
326 - 349 Transition Stage 3(4) 
350 - 374 Transition Stage 4(3) 
375 - 400 Stage 4 
 
Sociomoral Reasoning Measure- Short Form Objective (SRM-SFO; 
Basinger, Brugman, & Gibbs, 2007). The SRM-SFO is a relatively new moral 
reasoning recognition measure that requires individuals to recognize and select responses 
to moral questions (Appendix D). Based upon its predecessor, the SRM-SF, the SRM-
SFO elicits moral reasoning by asking questions about moral topics that are identical to 
those presented in the SRM-SF (e.g., keeping a promise). Individuals are asked to rate on 
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a 7-point Likert scale whether they believe each dilemma is “not important” to “very 
important” (i.e., the moral value component; Beerthuizen & Brugman, 2016). Participants 
must then select whether the provided reasons are close to a response the participant 
would provide. The participant is then asked to select which of the four provided reasons 
most closely reflect the reasoning they would give.  
 The SRM-SFO comprises of 10 questions, which measure five constructs: 
Contract and Truth, Affiliation, Life, Property and Law, and Legal Justice. The SRM-
SFO contains the same questions as the SRM-SF, excluding one question related to 
suicide. For the purpose of the current, three questions from van Vugt et al. (2008) and 
one question from Beerthuizen and Brugman (2012) were added to measure participants 
reasoning in the moral domain of love and sexual love. Thus, the SRM-SF will comprise 
of 14 questions which measure six moral domains. Each question related to a moral issue 
(e.g., “if you had to give a reason why it is [at least sometimes] important to keep a 
promise to a friend, if you can, what reason would you give?”), is followed by four 
reasonings that reflect each of the four stages within Gibb’s moral reasoning theory. For 
example, the response “because otherwise that person won’t be your friend again” for the 
above question demonstrates Stage 1 moral reasoning whereas, “because friendships as 
well as society must be based on trust” demonstrates Stage 4 reasoning. Participants must 
indicate whether the response is reflective of their own moral reasoning by either 
selecting ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘not sure’ beside the given response.  Participants are then asked 
to select which of the four provided best represents a response that individual would 
provide.  
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 A moral value evaluation score and two moral reasoning scores, the Sociomoral 
Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS) and the Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Percentage 
(SRMP), are calculated for the SRM-SFO. To calculate the moral value evaluation score, 
each question is given a score range between 1.00 to 7.00, with higher scores 
representing higher moral importance. These scores are then averaged across individual 
moral domains so that each moral domain has a single moral value evaluation score. The 
SRMS is calculated by first assigning each ‘yes’ answer the value that corresponds with 
that responses particular stage. For example, the response “because otherwise that person 
won’t be your friend again” represents Stage 1 reasoning, thus that particular response 
would be given a score of 1.00. Responses with either a ‘no’ or ‘not sure’ are given a 
value of 0. Then, scores (which represent the reasoning stage associated with that 
particular response) are assigned to the answer participants selected as the closest to their 
own reasoning. For example, if a participant selected the response “because friendships 
as well as society must be based on trust” (a Stage 4 response) as being the most 
reflective of their own moral reasoning, that participant would receive a score of 4.00. 
The average of the four reasoning responses (i.e., the ‘yes’ responses) are then added 
with the value of the response which is most reflective of the participant’s own reasoning, 
with the most reflective response being weighted twice as heavy as the reasoning 
responses, and divided by three. These responses are then averaged within and across 
each moral domain, producing a SRMS score for each moral domain and an overall 
SRMS score. The SRM-SFO has demonstrated acceptable internal consistency for the 
moral evaluation scale and the moral reasoning scale (Cronbach’s a = .72 and .58, 
respectively; Beerthuizen, Brugman, & Basinger, 2013).  
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The Self-Importance of Moral Identity Measure (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The 
Self-importance of Morality Identity Measure is a 10-item self-report questionnaire that 
measures both the internalization and symbolization of moral identity (Appendix E). 
Participants are provided a list of characteristics that are associated with a moral person 
and asked to imagine someone who embodies these characteristics. They are then asked 
to read statements and rate on a 5-point Likert scale the degree to which they agree with 
each statement, with 1 indicating “Strongly disagree” and 5 representing “Strongly 
agree”. For the purpose of the current study, only the five internalization questions of 
moral identity were utilized. The internalization subscale has been shown to be directly 
related how important moral characteristics are to an individual and has demonstrated 
validity in predicting altruistic behaviours (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Scores on each 
question will be summed and averaged, with two items being reverse coded. Thus, a 
single moral identity score ranging from 1 to 5 will be used, with higher scores 
representing greater self-relevance of moral characteristics. The Self-importance of Moral 
Identity Measure internalization subscale has demonstrated good reliability (Cronbach’s 
a range of .83 to .85; Reed & Aquino, 2003). 
Criminogenic Cognitions Scale (CCS; Tangney, Meyer, Furukawa, & Cosby, 
2002). The CCS is a 25-item self-report questionnaire designed to measure five cognition 
domains associated with criminality: Short term orientation (e.g., “The future is 
unpredictable and there is no point planning for it.”), notions of entitlement (e.g., “When 
I want something, I expect people to deliver.”), failure to accept responsibility (e.g., “Bad 
childhood experiences are partly to blame for my current situation.”), negative attitudes 
toward authority (e.g., “Most police officers/guards abuse their power.”), and 
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insensitivity to impact of crime (e.g., “My crime(s) did not really harm anyone.”). 
Participants are asked to read several statements and indicate on a 4-point Likert scale 
how applicable the statement is to their situation, with 1 indicating ‘Strongly disagree’ 
and 4 representing ‘Strongly agree’. For scoring, the total criminogenic cognitions scale 
is calculated by finding the mean of all items on the scale, with three items being reverse 
coded. Thus, scores range from 0 to 4, with a higher score representing more 
criminogenic cognitions. The CCS has demonstrated good reliability and validity 
(Tangney et al., 2012).  
Adversarial Heterosexual Beliefs Scale (AHBS; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1995). 
The Adversarial Heterosexual Belief Scale is a 15-item questionnaire that measures 
participants’ beliefs about the nature of relationships between romantic/sexual partners, 
including both platonic (e.g., “men and women cannot really be friends”) and romantic 
relationships (e.g., “It is natural for one spouse to be in control of the other.”) (Appendix 
G). Six of the 15 items are not specific to heterosexual relationships. Participants are 
asked to read statements about sex relationships and rate on a 7-point Likert scale the 
degree to which they agree with each statement, with 1 indicating “Strongly disagree” 
and 7 representing “Strongly agree”. Higher scores on the items represent more 
adversarial beliefs, with three items being reverse coded. The AHBS has demonstrated 
good internal consistency (Cronbach’s a = .78; Lonsways & Fitzgerald, 1995).  
Hostility Toward Women Scale (Longsway & Fitzgerald, 1995). The Hostility 
Toward Women Scale is a 10-item questionnaire that measures participants’ hostility 
towards women (Appendix H). Participants are asked to read statements about women 
(e.g., “I think that most women would lie just to get ahead.”) and rate on a 7-point Likert 
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scale how much the statement best describes them, with 1 indicating “Strongly disagree” 
and 7 representing “Strongly agree”. Higher scores on the items represent more hostility 
towards women, with two items being reverse coded (e.g., “I believe most women tell the 
truth” and “I usually find myself agreeing with [other] women.”). The Hostility Toward 
Women Scale has demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach’s a = .83; 
Lonsways & Fitzgerald, 1995).  
Hostility Toward Men Scale (Longsway & Fitzgerals, 1995). The Hostility 
Toward Men Scale is a 10-item questionnaire that measures participants’ hostility 
towards men and was adapted by the supervisor of this study for a different research 
project (Langton, 2018) using the Hostility Toward Women Scale (Appendix I). The 
statements on this measure are identical to the Hostility Toward Women Scale with the 
exception that ‘women’ has been changed to ‘men’, (e.g., “I think that most men would 
lie just to get ahead.”). Participants are asked to read statements about men and rate on a 
7-point Likert scale how much the statement best describes them, with 1 indicating 
‘Strongly disagree’ and 7 representing ‘Strongly agree’. Higher scores on the items 
represent more hostility towards men, with two items being reverse coded.  
Basic Demographic Information. Participants completed a basic demographic 
measure (Appendix J) that included questions about the participant’s gender identity, age, 
ethnicity, year of enrollment, and relationship status.  
  Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding-16 (BIDR-16; Hart, Ritchie, 
Hepper, Gebauer, 2015) The BIDR-16 is a 16-item short form questionnaire of the 40-
item Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991; see Appendix I). The 
BIDR-16 measures participants’ impression management (i.e., providing inaccurate 
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responses in order to appear more favourable) and self-deception (i.e., providing 
inaccurate, but believed, responses; Kroner & Weekes, 1996; Appendix K). Participants 
are asked to read statements (e.g., “I never regret my decisions.”) and rate on a 7-point 
Likert scale how true that statement is for them, with 1 indicating ‘Not true’ and 7 
representing ‘Very true’. In order to score the BIDR-16, 4 items per subscale are reverse 
coded (i.e., impression management subscale and self-deception enhancement subscale) 
and questions with ratings of 6 or 7 are given a score of 1. Thus, the minimum score is 0 
and the maximum score is 8 for each subscale. The BIDR-16 has demonstrated good 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s a = .63 to .83), test-retest reliability (r = .74 to .79; Hart 
et al., 2015). 
Procedure  
 Participants were recruited through the Psychology Participant Pool at the 
University of Windsor and received 1 bonus points towards an eligible class for their 
participation (1 bonus point). The online session took approximately 60 minutes to 
complete. Before the study began, participants were presented with the consent form. 
Participants were informed that they can skip any questions they feel uncomfortable 
providing a response for and can withdraw their participation at any time throughout the 
study by closing their web browser and emailing their request to withdraw to the primary 
investigator.   
After acquiring their consent, participants were asked to complete a series of 
online self-report questionnaires which included: basic demographics, Sociomoral 
Reasoning Measure-Short Form, Adversarial Heterosexual Beliefs Scale, the Hostility 
Towards Women Scale, The Hostility Towards Men scale, the Balanced Inventory of 
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Desirable Responding-16, the Postrefusal Sexual Persistence Scale, the Criminogenic 
Cognitions Scale, the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Measure, the Delinquent 
Activities Scale, the Sociomoral Reasoning Measure-Short Form Objective. Participants 
always received the basic demographics questionnaire first, followed by the Sociomoral 
Reasoning Measure-Short form. The Sociomoral Reasoning Measure- Short Form 
Objective was always given last. All other questionnaires were given in a randomized 
order. After the completion of the questionnaires, participants saw a notice thanking them 
for their participation.  
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CHAPTER IV RESULTS 
Data Screening 
Prior to conducting the main analyses, preliminary examination of the data was 
screened using Tabachnik and Fiedell (2007) recommendations. First, an examination of 
the validity measures was investigated. Second, the presence of outliers was investigated 
and the regression assumptions were assessed. Third, missing data analyses were 
conducted. Notably, the entire dataset was used for the initial stage of data screening as 
the entire dataset was required for the latter missing data correction technique (Enders, 
2010). All data screening was conducted using SPSS 23 (IBM, 2015).  
Validity Check. The validity of the data was checked using four individual measures. 
Two production measures and two recognition measures were utilized; with each type of 
measure asking either mathematical questions or language-based questions. These 
measures were to ensure that participants were paying adequate attention while 
completing the online questionnaires. A total of 13 participants made at least one mistake 
on one of the four validity measures. Only one participant made two mistakes. 
Participant’s data was then examined for indications of patterned responses. No such 
patterns were found. As such, the 13 participants’ data was left within the analyses. 
Additionally, validity checks within individual measures were also utilized (e.g., “If you 
are reading this select answer 4”). A total of 6 participants answered one of the validity 
checks incorrectly. Participants data was once again examined for indications of 
patterned responses. No such patterns were found. As such, the 6 participants’ data was 
left within the analyses.  
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Outliers. The data were investigated for the presence of both univariate and multivariate 
outliers. Univariate outliers were assessed using the combination of the z-score method 
and associated cut-offs set at ± 4 (Pituch & Stevens, 2016). No univariate outliers were 
found using this method. As both the latter missing data correction and the primary 
analysis (i.e., Path Analysis) procedures are based on regression calculations (Enders, 
2010) regression diagnostics were conducted to identify multivariate outliers. External 
studentized residuals were calculated and cut-offs of values above ±3 were used to 
identify extreme cases when the measured variables were positioned as dependent 
variables (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Twelve outliers were found. These 
values were plotted into an index plot for visual examination (Cohen et al., 2003). 
Inspection of the index plot did not identify any extreme outliers. Mahalanobis Distance 
statistics were calculated and a conservative chi-squared cut-off value was selected at p< 
.001 (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007) to classify outliers when the measured variables were 
positioned as independent variables. Three cases were found to be outliers. To examine 
whether outliers exerted undue global influence on the data DFFIT were run. The general 
cut-offs of ± 1 were utilized (Cohen at al., 2003). No influential outliers were found in 
the dataset. Subsequent calculations for specific influence using DFBETAs and cut-offs 
of ± 1 failed to identify any outlying cases. Thus, no outlier cases were deleted.  
Assumptions. The data was also examined to ensure that assumptions were met for the 
analyses conducted. Normality and Linearity are important assumptions for conducting 
regression procedures. Normality was first assessed at the univariate level. Inspection of 
histograms, skewness and kurtosis, and Shapiro-Wilk statistics indicated the majority of 
the variables were non-normally distributed. As univariate normality is required for 
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multivariate normality, multivariate normality can also be assumed to be violated 
(Looney et al., 1995); therefore, missing data estimation will have to be conducted with 
caution (Enders, 2010). Linearity was evaluated using bivariate scatter plots (Cohen et 
al., 2003). There were too many variables to conduct a comprehensive inspection of each 
bivariate combination thus, a randomly selected subset of the variables was examined 
(Cohen et al., 2003; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). The random selection of bivariate 
scatterplots yielded no curvilinear relations. As curvilinear data is more problematic than 
poor linear relations, the data met the assumption of linearity. In addition, conditions of 
multicollinearity and singularity were assessed (Kline, 2011; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). 
First, Spearman’s correlation matrix was examined to assess univariate collinearity at 
values at or above rs = .9. Collinearity was not found. Multicollinearity was assessed 
using Tolerance statistics with values at or below .10 indicating conditions of 
multicollinearity (Kline, 2011; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). Multicollinearity was not 
found to be an issue for the dataset (values ranged from .234 to .802). Finally, 
homoscedasticity was assessed using scatterplot of residuals versus predicted values, no 
clear pattern within the distributions was found (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).  
The assumptions of multivariate normality are satisfied if there is a minimum of 
20 degrees of freedom between participant error terms (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). The 
degrees of freedom between participant errors were df = 112, therefore, this assumption 
was met. A Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was used to inspect the 
homogeneity of covariance within each dependent variable. The analyses revealed that 
the variance within certain dependent variables were significantly different, meaning that 
the variance between variables is unlikely to occur by chance. The null hypothesis of 
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equal variance was rejected in the following variables: moral identity, F(1, 120) = 29.97, 
p < .001 and moral reasoning for sexually coercive behaviours F(1, 120) = 6.06, p = .015. 
A Hotelling’s T2 statistic was used to report the results, as it is robust to homogeneity of 
covariance violations (Field, 2009). 
Missing Data. The progression of missing data evaluation follows the recommendations 
of Enders (2010). In the current dataset, missingness per variable of interest ranged from 
0% to 10.6%. Next, Little’s test of Missing Completely At Random (MCAR) was 
conducted and indicated the data was MCAR with the exception of the Criminogenic 
Cognitions Scale (CCS). As there are no statistical tests to determine if data are Missing 
at Random (MAR) or Missing Not at Random (MNAR) the questions were qualitatively 
evaluated to determine if the content of the item might have influenced non-responding. 
An examination of the questions revealed that the unanswered questions were no more 
sensitive than other questions on the measure and there were no obvious reasons for the 
missing data. As such, the data is believed to be MAR. For the current analysis, the 
Expected-Maximization (EM) was utilized. EM is a Multiple Imputations (MI) technique 
that produces unbiased estimates when missingness has been found to be MCAR or MAR 
(Lee & Huber, 2011). When missingness is found to be NMAR, MI creates biased 
estimates when the percentage of missing data is high (Lee & Huber, 2011). Given that 
CCS had a total of 5.5% missing data, biased estimates were not a concern. Thus, these 
final values were used in the place of the original missing values. The newly imputed 
dataset was then screened again as values had been added. 
Inter-rater reliability on SRM-SF. In the current study, interrater reliability was 
evaluated based on a sample of 10.16 % of the qualitative answers on the SRM-SF 
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selected through a random number generator. Cohen’s k was run to determine if there 
was agreement between raters on their judgment of which moral reasoning stage 
qualitative answers on the SRM-SF belonged to. There was moderate agreement between 
the two raters’ judgments, k = .520, p < .001.   
Investigation of Gender Differences on Main Variables of Interest. Descriptive 
statistics for the main variables of interest for males, females, and genders combined can 
be found in Table 3. To investigate gender differences on the main variables of interest a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. Nine dependent variables 
were included in the analysis: moral value evaluation for general delinquency, moral 
value evaluation for sexually coercive behaviours, moral reasoning for general 
delinquency, moral reasoning for sexually coercive behaviours, moral identity, 
criminogenic cognitions, adversarial beliefs, delinquent activity, and sexually coercive 
behaviours. Using a Hotelling’s T2 test statistics, there was a significant main effect of 
gender, T = .301, F(9, 112) = 3.76, p < .001. To investigate this significant main effect, 
univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAS) were run for each of the dependent variables 
with gender included as the independent variable (see Table 4). There was a significant 
difference between males and females on adversarial beliefs F(1, 120) = 6.61, p =.011, η2 
=.05; criminogenic cognitions, F(1, 120) = 10.12, p = .002, η2 =.078; moral identity, F(1, 
120) = 19.97, p < .001, η2 =.143; and moral reasoning for sexually coercive behaviours, 
F(1, 120) = 6.68. p = 0.11, η2 =.053. 
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Table 3.  
Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Interest for Male, 
Female and Genders Combined. 
 Min Max M SD 
Variable     
MVE     
     Male 4.24 7.00 5.88 0.69 
     Female 4.39 7.00 6.00 0.56 
     Combined 4.24 7.00 5.10 0.59 
MVE-S     
     Male 3.88 5.31 4.73 0.33 
     Female 4.00 5.31 4.83 0.30 
     Combined 3.88 5.31 4.81 0.31 
MR     
     Male 1.89 3.53 2.90 0.34 
     Female 2.11 3.48 3.01 0.25 
     Combined 1.89 3.53 2.99 0.27 
MR-S     
     Male 2.35 3.69 2.91 0.33 
     Female 2.35 3.69 3.06 0.25 
     Combined 2.35 3.69 3.02 0.27 
Moral ID     
     Male 8.00 13.00 10.81 1.12 
     Female 3.00 18.00 11.45 1.95 
     Combined 3.00 18.00 11.31 1.81 
CCS     
     Male 21.00 49.00 37.03 7.73 
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     Female 13.00 56.00 32.29 7.55 
     Combined 13.00 56.00 33.39 7.80 
ABS     
     Male 1.00 46.00 23.00 12.20 
     Female 1.00 48.00 16.88 12.02 
     Combined 1.00 48.00 18.10 11.40 
DAS     
     Male 0.00 19.00 9.93 5.90 
     Female 0.00 40.00 7.11 7.05 
     Combined 0.00 40.00 7.79 6.90 
PSPS     
     Male 0.00 14.00 1.33 3.00 
     Female 0.00 11.00 0.81 1.84 
     Combined 0.00 14.00 0.92 2.12 
Note. MVE = moral value evaluation for general delinquency, MVE-S 
= moral value evaluation for sexually coercive behaviours, MR = 
moral reasoning for general delinquency, MR-S = moral reasoning for 
sexually coercive behaviours, Moral ID = moral identity, CCS = 
criminogenic cognitions scale, ABS = adversarial beliefs scale, DAS = 
delinquent activities scale, PSPS = post-refusal sexual persistence 
scale. 
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Table 4.  
ANOVAs with Gender as an Independent Variable 
Source df SS MS F p η2 
MVE 1 0.33 0.33 0.94 .335 .008 
MVE-S 1 0.19 0.19 2.06 .154 .017 
MR 1 0.25 0.25 3.64 .059 .029 
MR-S 1 0.47 .047 6.68 .011 .053 
Moral ID 1 138.23 138.23 19.98 <.001 .143 
CCS 1 510.08 510.08 10.12 .002 .078 
ABS 1 804.13 804.13 6.62 .011 .052 
DAS 1 167.28 167.28 3.59 .060 .029 
PSPS 1 5.75 5.75 1.25 .266 .010 
Note. N=122, MVE = moral value evaluation for general delinquency, MVE-S = 
moral value evaluation for sexually coercive behaviours, MR = moral reasoning 
for general delinquency, MR-S = moral reasoning for sexually coercive 
behaviours, Moral ID = moral identity, CCS = criminogenic cognitions scale, 
ABS = adversarial beliefs scale, DAS = delinquent activities scale, PSPS = post-
refusal sexual persistence scale. 
Primary Analyses  
Hypothesis set one: Moral value evaluation, moral reasoning, moral identity and 
criminogenic cognitions are significantly correlated with self-reported deviant 
behaviours.  To address these hypotheses, bivariate correlations and partial correlations 
were calculated between self-reported delinquent activity and each of the dependent 
variables, with the desirable responding statistically controlled in the partial correlations. 
Specifically, hypothesis 1(a) predicted that general delinquency would be negatively 
correlated with moral value evaluation, moral reasoning, and moral identity. This 
hypothesis was not supported, as neither the partial correlations or the bivariate 
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correlations found a significant association between the variables of interest (see Table 
5). It was also hypothesized that general delinquency would be positively correlated with 
criminogenic cognition. There was a significant positive correlation between self-
reported delinquency and criminogenic cognitions in the bivariate correlations and the 
partial correlations (see Table 5) thus, hypothesis 1(b) was supported. Finally, hypothesis 
1(c) predicted that criminogenic cognitions would be negatively correlated with moral 
value evaluation, moral reasoning, and moral identity. The bivariate correlations partially 
supported this hypothesis, as there was a significant association between moral value 
evaluation and criminogenic cognitions (see Table 5). However, this association became 
non-significant when social desirability was controlled for in the partial correlations. 
Thus, hypothesis 1(c) was not supported.  
Table 5.  
Bivariate Correlation and Partial Correlations Between Moral Cognitions and 
General Delinquency. 
 Moral Value 
Evaluation 
Moral 
Reasoning 
Moral 
Identity 
Criminogenic 
Cognitions 
Delinquent 
Activity 
Mora Value 
Evaluation 
- -.038 -.038 -.138 .044 
Moral 
Reasoning 
-.018 - .286** -.124 .123 
Moral 
Identity 
.056 .290** - -.001 -.026 
Criminogenic 
Cognitions 
-.206* -.134 -.071 - .189* 
Delinquent 
Activity 
-.025 .108 -.083 .230* - 
Note. Below the diagonal are bivariate correlations, above the diagonal are partial 
correlations controlling for social desirability.  *p < .05, **p <.01 
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Hypothesis set two: Moral cognitions are significant predictors of general 
delinquency. In order to test this hypothesis, a modified path model based on Barringa et 
al., (2001) and Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) was utilized (see Figure 13). A notable 
difference between the current model and the models run by Barringa et al (2001) and 
Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) was the inclusion of desirable responding as a control 
variable. A power analysis conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009), assuming a medium effect size and a power level greater than .95, indicated that 
129 participants in total would be needed for a study including four predictor variables. 
Given that the current study had 123 participants, the model was underpowered.    
 The current model did not fit the data well, as can be seen from the goodness-of-
fit statistics shown in Table 6. However, Jackson (2003) stated that small sample size 
tends to produce poor fits. Hypothesis 2(a) predicted that moral reasoning would have a 
significant direct effect on general delinquency. A non-significant direct effect of moral 
reasoning on general delinquency, β = .170 p= .058, was found. As such, the hypothesis 
was not supported. Hypothesis 2(b) predicted that moral identity and criminogenic 
cognitions would be significant predictors of general delinquency. There was no 
significant direct effect of moral identity on general delinquency β = -.075, p= .423. 
However, there was a significant positive association between criminogenic cognitions 
and general delinquency, β = .221, p= .013, with higher criminogenic cognitions 
predicting higher engagement in delinquent behaviour. As such, hypothesis 2(b) was 
partially supported. Next, hypothesis 2(c) predicted that moral value evaluation would 
have an indirect effect on general delinquency. As expected, there was no significant 
direct effect between moral value evaluation and general delinquency, β = .080, p= .352.  
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Table 6.  
Summary of Goodness-of-Fit Indices for General 
Delinquency Model  
χ2 CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA 
12.969(1) .737 -2.943 .359 .313 
p <.001     
 
To test the indirect effects, a macro program developed by Preacher and Hayes 
(2008) was used, as AMOS does not provide significance levels for indirect effects. 
There was a significant negative indirect effect of moral value evaluation on general 
delinquency through the proposed mediators (i.e., moral identity, moral reasoning, and 
criminogenic cognitions), β = -.807, p= .039.  As such, the hypothesis was supported. 
Hypothesis 2(d) predicted that criminogenic cognitions would mediate the association 
between moral reasoning and general delinquency. The hypothesis was not supported, as 
there no significant indirect effects of moral reasoning on delinquency through 
criminogenic cognitions was found, β = -.577, p= .313. However, it should be noted that 
the association was in the expected direction. Finally, hypothesis 2(e) predicted that 
criminogenic cognitions would mediate the association between moral identity and 
general delinquency, this hypothesis was not supported β = -.039, p= .453.    
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Figure 13. Path analysis for moral cognitions on general delinquency. Note. * p < .05, ** 
p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Hypothesis set three: Moral value evaluation, moral reasoning, moral identity and 
criminogenic cognitions are significantly correlated with self-reported sexually 
coercive behaviours. To address the third set of hypotheses, bivariate correlations as 
well as partial correlations were run between self-reported sexually coercive behaviours 
and each of the dependent variables, with desirable responding statistically controlled in 
the analysis. Hypothesis 3(a) predicted that sexually coercive behaviours would be 
negatively correlated with moral value evaluation, moral reasoning, and moral identity. 
This hypothesis was not supported, as no associations between the variables of interest 
were found in the bivariate correlations nor the partial correlations (see Table 7). Recall 
that hypothesis 3(b) predicted that sexually coercive behaviours would be positively 
correlated with criminogenic cognitions. This hypothesis was supported when examining 
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the bivariate correlations as well as the partial correlations controlling for social 
desirability. As such, hypothesis 3(b) was supported.  
Table 7.  
Bivariate Correlations and Partial Correlations Between Moral Cognitions and 
Sexually Coercive Behaviours  
 Moral Value 
Evaluation 
Moral 
Reasoning 
Moral 
Identity 
Criminogenic 
Cognitions 
Sexually 
Coercive 
Behaviours 
Mora Value 
Evaluation 
- .560*** .113 -.200* -.032 
Moral 
Reasoning 
.565*** - .236** -.131 -.041 
Moral 
Identity 
.144 .253** - -.241** -.073 
Criminogenic 
Cognitions 
-.231* -.157 -.314*** - .202* 
Sexually 
Coercive 
Behaviours 
-.057 -.060 -.125 .254** - 
Note. Below the diagonal are bivariate correlations, above the diagonal are partial 
correlations controlling for social desirability.  *p < .05, **p <.01, *** p <.001 
 
Hypothesis set four: Moral cognitions are significant predictors of sexually coercive 
behaviours. The fourth set of hypotheses predicted that moral cognitions would be 
significant predictors of sexually coercive behaviours. Once again, a modified path model 
based on Barringa et al., (2001) and Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) was utilized, with 
hostile attitudes and desirable responding as controls (see Figure 14). An inspection of 
the goodness-of-fit indices indicated a better fitting model than the path model for 
general delinquency (see Table 8). Specifically, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), which 
is not very sensitive to sample size, and the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) and the Root Mean 
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Square Error Approximation (RMSEA), indicated a good fitting model. However, the 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) indicated a poor fitting model. 
Table 8.  
Summary of Goodness-of-Fit Indices for Sexually 
Coercive Behaviours Model.  
χ2 CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA 
2.067(2) 1.000 .995 .927 .017 
p = .356     
  
Recall that hypothesis 4(a) predicted that moral reasoning would have a 
significant direct effect on sexually coercive behaviours. No significant association 
between the two variables was found and the hypothesis was not supported, β = .012, p = 
.911. Hypothesis 4(b) predicted that both moral identity, β = -.020, p = .831 and 
criminogenic cognitions, β = .141, p = .183 would be significant predictors of sexually 
coercive behaviours. An examination of the path model revealed no significant 
associations, however, both paths were in the expected direction. Hypothesis 4(c) 
predicted that moral value evaluation would have an indirect effect on sexually coercive 
behaviours and be fully mediated through moral reasoning, moral identity, and 
criminogenic cognitions. As expected, there was no significant direct effect of moral 
value evaluation on sexually coercive behaviours β = -.010, p = .927. As hypothesized, 
there was a significant negative indirect effect of moral value evaluation on sexually 
coercive behaviours through the proposed mediators (i.e., moral identity, moral 
reasoning, criminogenic cognitions), β = -.274, p = .042.  There was also a significant 
positive direct effect of moral value evaluation on moral reasoning, β = .563, p < .001 
and a significant negative direct effect on criminogenic cognitions, β = -.242, p = .007. 
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However, no significant direct effect of moral value evaluation on moral identity was 
found. There was a significant negative direct effect of moral identity on criminogenic 
cognitions β = -.172, p= .030. Additionally, there was a significant direct effect of moral 
reasoning on moral identity β = .212, p= .042. In order to test hypothesis 4(d), which 
predicted that criminogenic cognitions would mediate the association between moral 
reasoning and sexually coercive behaviours, indirect effects were examined using the 
macro program developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008). There were no significant 
indirect effects of moral reasoning on sexually coercive behaviours through criminogenic 
cognition, β = -.335, p= .104. Thus, the hypothesis was not supported. The final 
hypothesis in this set predicted that criminogenic cognitions would mediate the 
association between moral identity and sexually coercive behaviours. This hypothesis 
was supported as there was a significant negative indirect effect of moral identity on 
sexually coercive behaviour β = -.057, p= .034. 
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 Figure 14. Path analysis for moral cognitions on sexually coercive behaviours. Note. * p 
< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Hypothesis set five: SRM-SFO would be a valid measure of moral reasoning. Recall 
that the final set of hypotheses aimed to investigate whether the SRM-SFO is a valid 
measure for moral reasoning when compared to the SRM-SF. In order to test hypothesis 
5(a), which predicted that there would be a positive correlation between the two 
measures, a correlation analysis was conducted. Correlation analysis was run between 
moral reasoning on the SRM-SF and moral reasoning on the SRM-SFO. There was a 
non-significant positive correlation between SRM-SF moral reasoning and SRM-SFO 
moral reasoning, r = .133, p = .073. Additionally, to address hypothesis 5(b) which 
predicted that the SRM-SFO would produce higher moral reasoning stages, a paired 
samples t-test was conducted. There was a significant difference in the scores for moral 
reasoning on the SRM-SF (M= 2.91, SD = 361) and the SRM-SFO (M = 3.054, SD = 
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.397; t(120) = 3.00, p = .003) with the SRM-SFO producing higher scores. As such, the 
hypothesis was supported.     
Additional Analyses. 
 Path analysis using only the SRM-SFO as the moral reasoning measure for 
general delinquency.  Given the low inter-rater reliability produced by the SRM-SF, the 
path analysis investigating moral cognitions and general delinquency was run only using 
the SRM-SFO as the moral reasoning measure. Recall, that hypothesis 2(a) predicted that 
moral reasoning would have a significant direct effect on general delinquency. Similar to 
the previously run model, there was no significant direct effect of moral reasoning on 
general delinquency, β = .084 p= .346. As such, the hypothesis was not supported. 
Comparable to the previous model, there was no significant direct effect of moral identity 
on general delinquency β = -.045, p= .628. However, there was a significant positive 
association between criminogenic cognitions and general delinquency, β = .206, p= .020. 
As such, hypothesis 2(b) was partially supported. Next, hypothesis 2(c) predicted that 
moral value evaluation would have an indirect effect on general delinquency. As 
expected, there was no significant direct effect between moral value evaluation and 
general delinquency, β = .069, p= .426. 
In line with the previous model, there was a significant negative indirect effect of 
moral value evaluation on general delinquency through the proposed mediators (i.e., 
moral identity, moral reasoning, and criminogenic cognitions), β = -1.065, p= .027. As 
such, the hypothesis was supported. Hypothesis 2(d) predicted that criminogenic 
cognitions would mediate the association between moral reasoning and general 
delinquency. The hypothesis was not supported, as there no significant indirect effects of 
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moral reasoning on delinquency through criminogenic cognitions was found, β = -.577, 
p= .313. However, it should be noted that the association was in the expected direction. 
Finally, hypothesis 2(e) predicted that criminogenic cognitions would mediate the 
association between moral identity and general delinquency, this hypothesis was not 
supported β = -.471, p= .255.   
Path analysis using only the SRM-SFO as the moral reasoning measure for 
sexually coercive behaviours. In line with the previous model investigating moral 
cognitions on sexually coercive behaviours, there was no significant association between 
moral reasoning and sexually coercive behaviours, β = .003, p = .971. There were no 
significant associations between sexually coercive behaviours and moral identity, β = -
.018, p = .844, or sexually coercive behaviours and criminogenic cognitions, β = .142, p 
= .175. As expected, there was no significant direct effect of moral value evaluation on 
sexually coercive behaviours β = -.003, p = .973. Similar to the previous model, there 
was a significant negative indirect effect of moral value evaluation on sexually coercive 
behaviours through the proposed mediators (i.e., moral identity, moral reasoning, 
criminogenic cognitions), β = -.281, p = .037.  There were no significant indirect effects 
of moral reasoning on sexually coercive behaviours through criminogenic cognition, β = -
.190, p= .199. The final hypothesis in this set predicted that criminogenic cognitions 
would mediate the association between moral identity and sexually coercive behaviours. 
This hypothesis was supported as there was a significant negative indirect effect of moral 
identity on sexually coercive behaviour β = -.056, p= .037. 
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Correlation analysis between the SRM-SF and the SRM-SFO on individual questions. 
Given the surprising finding that the two moral reasoning measures were not significantly 
correlated, an additional correlation analysis comparing the individual moral reasoning 
questions on each measure was conducted. The analysis revealed that only four of the 
questions were significantly correlated with each other. More specifically, the questions 
asking how important it is to: keep a promise to a child (r = .201, p = .030), save a life of 
a friend (r = .310, p = .001), not steal (r = .213, p = .023) and for a judge to send people 
to jail (r .209, p = .028) were significant. All other question pairings were non-significant 
and correlations ranged from r = .004 to r = .101.  
Table 9.  
Correlations between paired questions on the SRM-SF and the SRM-SFO. 
Question (r) Sig. 
How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can, to 
friends? 
.004 .960 
How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can, even 
to someone they hardly know?  
.009 .928 
How important is it for parents to keep promises, if they can, to 
their children? 
.201 .030 
How important is it for people to tell the truth?  .013 .895 
How important is it for children to help their parents?  .022 .819 
How important is it for a person (without losing his or her own life) 
to save the life of a friend? 
.310 .001 
How important is it for a person (without losing his or her own life) 
to save the life of a stranger?  
.080 .400 
How important is it for people not to take things that belong to 
other people?  
.213 .023 
How important is it for people to obey the law?  .101 .284 
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How Important is it for judges to send people who break the law to 
jail? 
.209 .028 
How important is it that people are not allowed to force others into 
having sex? 
.097 .304 
How important is it that victims of sexual abuse receive help? .097 .304 
How important is it that rapists are being punished?  .031 .749 
Imagine two people kissing. How important is it that someone 
stops kissing if the other person says no?  
.026 .781 
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CHAPTER V DISCUSSION 
 The main goal of the present study was to replicate Barriga’s et al. (2001) updated 
cognitive developmental model (Beerthuizen & Brugman, 2013) and extend their work 
by applying the model to sexually coercive behaviours. To investigate these associations, 
participants completed online questionnaires that measured their moral value evaluation, 
moral reasoning, moral identity, criminogenic cognitions and self-reported delinquent 
behaviours, including sexually coercive behaviours. Additionally, hostile attitudes 
towards men/women and desirable responding where measured and were used as control 
variables. The secondary goal of the current study was to gain insight into the concurrent 
validity of a relatively new recognition moral reasoning measure the SRM-SFO 
(Basinger et al., 2007) by comparing it to a well-established production moral reasoning 
measure the SRM-SF (Gibbs et al., 1992). Gender differences on the variables of interest 
will be discussed first. This will then be proceeded by a discussion of moral cognitions in 
association to general delinquency followed by a discussion of moral cognitions in 
association to sexually coercive behaviours. Finally, the investigation of the SRM-SFO in 
comparison to the SRM-FO will be reviewed.  
Gender Differences in Moral Cognitions and Antisocial Behaviours  
The current study’s path model is based on the work of Barriga et al. (2001) and 
Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013). Within both of the respective studies, gender 
differences were investigated by running the separate path models for males and females. 
Barriga and colleagues found that female participants endorsed higher moral self-
concepts (i.e., moral identity) and significantly less self-serving cognition distortions 
when compared to their male counterparts. However, in their path analyses, they found 
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no difference in the association between moral cognitions and delinquent behaviours 
when comparing males and females. Using Barriga et al. (2001) model with the addition 
of moral value evaluation, Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) found that overall males and 
females exhibit the same patterns between moral cognitions and self-reported delinquent 
behaviours. However, there was a notable exception. Moral identity was significantly 
related to self-reported delinquent behaviours in females but not males, with females 
endorsing lower levels of moral characteristics engaging in higher levels of deviant 
behaviours. One aim of the current research was to investigate gender differences in 
extensions of these earlier models.   
Given the relatively low male participation rate (22%) as well as the smaller 
sample size (i.e., 123 participants in total) running separate path analyses based on gender 
was not statistically appropriate. Thus, in the current study data for males and females 
within the sample were analyzed together and gender differences were only explored in 
terms of simple group differences on the variables of interest. Broadly speaking, effect 
sizes indicated no meaningful differences between men and women on the variables of 
interest, with the exception of moral identity scores (which aligns with both Barriga and 
Beerthuizen’s previous findings). Women endorse, on average, more morally relevant 
moral characteristics when compared to men. Not being able to fully explore gender 
differences is a limitation of the current study. However, the general finding in the extant 
literature that the pattern of associations between moral cognitions and delinquent 
behaviours are similar across gender, would suggest that the findings of the current study 
may not be heavily influenced by the use of a combined sample.  
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Correlations between Moral Cognitions and General Delinquency 
 Both Barriga et al. (2001) and Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) studies found 
significant associations in the expected direction between moral reasoning, moral 
identity, self-serving cognitive distortions (i.e., an aspect of criminogenic cognitions) and 
general delinquency. Additionally, Beerthuizen et al. (2013) found a significant negative 
correlation between moral value evaluation and delinquent behaviour. In line with 
previous research, the current study found a significant positive association between 
criminogenic cognitions and self-reported delinquent activity (e.g., Barriga et al., 2001; 
Beerthuizen & Brugman, 2013; Tangney et al., 2012). Recall, that criminogenic 
cognitions include beliefs and attitudes that offenders use to minimize and rationalize 
their deviant behaviours (Tangney et al., 2012). As such, those who engaged in deviant 
behaviours were more likely to use self-serving cognitive distortions (a facet of 
criminogenic cognitions) to reduce feelings of guilt and responsibility, which in turn 
protected the individuals’ core concept of themselves as “good” person (Barriga et al., 
2000; Barriga et al., 2001). Additionally, individuals who engaged in deviant behaviours 
were more likely to have negative attitudes towards authority and demonstrate more 
short-term thinking. 
 To measure self-serving cognitive distortions, previous research (e.g., Barriga et 
al., 2001) relied on measures that depended heavily on behavioural context (i.e., the HIT 
questionnaire). Importantly, the current study utilized a criminogenic cognitions scale 
(i.e., the Criminogenic Cognitions Scale; Tangney et al., 2012), that used the 
endorsement of certain attitudes and beliefs, instead of relying on behavioural context. As 
such, one can be more confident that the association between criminogenic cognitions 
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and delinquent behaviour is not due to measure contamination and is an important facet 
of an individual’s moral cognition.  
The current study also found a small negative correlation between moral 
reasoning and delinquent behaviours. This aligns with Barriga’s et al. (2001) findings, in 
which the authors found a small negative correlation (i.e., r= -.20) between moral 
reasoning and delinquent behaviours. As such, it appears that as individuals reach higher 
stages of moral reasoning they become less likely to engage in delinquent behaviours. 
This finding supports the theoretical understanding of delayed moral development being 
a potential contributing factor to individuals engaging in antisocial behaviours (e.g., 
Kohlberg et al., 1975; Palmer, 2003).  
In contrast to the findings of Barriga et al (2001) and Beerthuizen and Brugman 
(2013), the current study did not find meaningful associations between moral value 
evaluation, moral identity and general delinquency.  However, there are several 
differences between the current study and those done by Barriga and Beerthuizen that 
may explain the discrepancies in findings. Perhaps the most obvious difference is the 
relatively small sample size of the current study when compared to that of Beerthuizen 
(i.e., 542 participants) and Barriga (i.e., 193 participants). Beerthuizen justified such a 
large sample as it allowed “even relatively weak relationships to emerge” (p.317). Thus, 
it is probable that the current study did not have enough power to allow these weaker 
associations to become apparent.  
 Additionally, the age range of the current sample (i.e., 18- to 43-years-old, M = 
22.37-years-old) was older and larger than the sample in both Barriga’s et al. (2001; i.e., 
16- to 19-years-old, M = 18.23-years-old) and Beerthuizen and Brugman’s (2013; i.e., 
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11- to 18-years-old, M = 14.3-years-old) studies. This is an important difference, as 
Barriga originally proposed his model as a developmental model. That is, as individuals 
mature so does their moral reasoning and the importance they place on moral 
characteristics being part of their self-concepts. This conceptualization aligns with 
Kohlberg’s and later Gibbs’ conceptualization of moral stages (Gibbs et al., 2007; 
Kohlberg, 1981). Specifically, children, young adolescents, and those involved in 
frequent criminal activity demonstrate immature moral reasoning, whereas, older 
adolescents and adults would reach mature moral reasoning. Barriga and then 
Beerthuizen proposed that similar to moral reasoning, moral identity, and later moral 
value evaluation (Beerthuizen et al., 2013 addition to the model) would also mature with 
development and these moral cognitions would protect against self-serving cognitive 
distortions. Therefore, the current sample may have been too mature to capture the 
differences in moral development.  
Even though Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) proposed that the maturation 
would protect against self-serving cognitive distortions, criminogenic cognitions 
appeared to be a more stable feature of an individual than other moral cognitions. As 
such, criminogenic cognitions may not be influenced by developmental maturation in the 
same way as other moral cognitions. There are several reasons as to why criminogenic 
cognitions may not necessarily decrease as an individual matures. As noted above, an 
aspect of criminogenic cognitions are beliefs and attitudes. Unsurprisingly, attitudes and 
beliefs are not easily changed and an entire field of research has emerged investigating 
and building theories on how to effectively persuade people to change their current 
attitudes (Petty & Brinol, 2010). 
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Additionally, research has demonstrated that negative interactions with authority 
figures have been linked to adverse attitudes towards authority (Hurts & Frank, 2000) and 
that negative attitudes towards one authority type (e.g., teachers) is predictive of negative 
attitudes towards other authority figures (e.g., police; Nihart, Lersch & Mieczkowski, 
2005). As such, an individual who committed deviant behaviours as an adolescent may 
have had negative interactions with parents, teachers or law enforcement. These 
individual then continue to interact with authority figures in such a way that perpetuate 
these negative interactions (e.g., self-fulfilling prophecy; Jussim, 1986). Although the 
individual may no longer come into contact with law enforcement, they continue to 
interact with authority in an adverse way that not only confirms their attitude towards 
authority but translates to all authority types, not just the one in which they have 
experienced negatively.  
Another important aspect to consider is when participants engaged in their 
delinquent behaviour. Specifically, at what point in the participants’ lifetime did they 
engage in the anti-social behaviour they are reporting on the Delinquent Activities Scale 
(DAS). The current study’s DAS questionnaire asked whether participants have ever 
engaged in certain delinquent activities. It is possible that participants were reporting 
activities that they engaged in several years ago. This assumption is in line with the “age-
crime curve”, which states that crime increases in adolescence (with a peak around 15-
years-old) and decreases in adulthood (Shulman, Steinberg, & Piquero, 2013). As such, a 
participant who is 20-years-old (the median age in the current study) may be reporting 
delinquent behaviours from 5 years ago. Yet, the moral value evaluation, moral 
reasoning, and moral identity measures were not retrospective but measured the 
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participants’ current moral cognitions. Thus, participants may have reported antisocial 
activities from a time in their life when they had less mature moral cognitions. As such, it 
is possible that even the youngest participants were reporting activities that happened at a 
time when they had immature moral cognitions that are no longer reflective of their 
current morals.  
Even though both Barriga et al. (2001) and Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) used 
a delinquency scale that asked whether participants had ever engaged in a certain 
delinquent activity (similar to the DAS questionnaire used in the current study), given the 
age of the participants within their studies, participants would have had less time lapse 
between delinquent activity and when they were retrospectivity reporting these activities. 
More specifically, in Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) the average age of a participant 
was 14-years-old. This is around the general time in which criminal behaviour reaches its 
peak. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that the activities reported in this study 
would be relatively recent and still reflective of the participants’ current moral 
cognitions. As such, future research investigating moral cognitions in an adult population 
should specify the recency of the delinquent behaviours. This will help to ensure that the 
moral cognitions being measured are reflective of the moral maturity the individual had 
at the time they committed the antisocial act. 
Direct and Indirect Effects Between Moral Cognitions and General Delinquency 
 The current study investigated the association between moral cognitions and 
general delinquency by using a modified path analyses based on the models described by 
Barringa et al. (2001) and Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013). More specifically, moral 
value evaluation, moral reasoning, moral identity and criminogenic cognitions were 
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investigated in terms of their association to each other as well as their association to the 
outcome variable of delinquent behaviour. Unique to the current study, social desirability 
responding was used as a control within the model. Overall, the fit of the model to the 
data was poor. However, in both Barringa’s and Beerthuizen’s models, all possible 
parameters were included. As such, model fit was not evaluated in either study, as it was 
not statistically appropriate. Thus, it is unclear as to whether the current model’s fit is 
meaningfully different from previous research.  
 Both Barriga et al. (2001) and Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) found a 
marginally significant negative association between moral reasoning and delinquent 
behaviours. More specifically, immature moral reasoning was related to higher reports of 
delinquent activity. However, in the current study, the opposite association was found, 
with more mature moral reasoning being significantly related to higher rates of 
delinquent behaviours. As discussed above, this may be due to the time lapse between 
when these delinquent activities occurred and when the individual’s moral reasoning was 
measured. For example, a participate who is 20-years-old and has reached a mature stage 
of moral reasoning may have reported delinquent activity they engaged in during a period 
in their life when they were at an immature moral stage. As such, the association between 
moral reasoning and delinquent behaviour would be positive, but not so if measured for a 
contemporaneous period.   
 Another possible explanation for this positive association was originally proposed 
by Palmer (2003). He stated that delinquent behaviour can be justified at all 
developmental levels of moral reasoning. For example, an individual whose has achieved 
a stage 3 moral reasoning level may justify delinquent behaviour by reasoning that it 
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helped to maintain important relationships (Palmer, 2003). However, it would require 
substantial mental gymnastics to justify all delinquent behaviour as either maintaining 
relationships (stage 3), maintaining society (stage 4), or maintaining/furthering social 
justice (stage 5). Thus, this is not a likely explanation as to why individuals with higher 
moral reasoning were found to engage in higher levels of delinquent activity.  
 It should also be noted that one of the current moral reasoning measures, the 
SRM-SF, had lower inter-rater agreement than demonstrated in previous research (e.g., 
Barriga et al., 2001). Although two moral reasoning measures were used (i.e., the SRM-
SF and the SRM-SFO) it is possible that the qualitative answers provided by the 
participants on the SRM-SF were not detailed enough and/or the coding of these 
responses was not sufficiently reliable to accurately reflect participants moral reasoning. 
The qualitative answers provided on the SRM-SF were significantly shorter and less 
detailed than those provided in the SRM-SF manual (Gibbs et al., 1992). The lack of 
detail in participants reasoning behind why certain moral issues were important (or were 
not important) made coding the answers challenging at times. As such, the moral 
reasoning stages produced by the SRM-SF should be interpreted with caution. Given the 
lower inter-rater agreement, additional analyses using only the SRM-SFO (which was 
used by Beerthuizen & Brugman, 2013) were run to examine whether the results of the 
path models would differ. However, results between the two path analyses (i.e., one path 
model run with both the SRM-SF and the SRM-SFO and one path analysis only run with 
the SRM-SFO) produced identical results. Thus, one can be more confident in the results 
of the original path analyses conducted.  
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 As expected, there was a significant and positive direct effect of criminogenic 
cognitions on delinquent activity. This finding aligns with both Barriga’s et al. (2001) 
and Beerthuizen and Brugman’s (2013) results, as well as others (e.g., Tangney et al., 
2012; Tangney et al., 2007). It appears that individuals who engage in self-serving 
cognitive distortions and have anti-authority attitudes are more likely to engage in 
delinquent behaviours. As previously discussed, these distortions likely protect the 
individual’s self-concept and neutralize feelings of self-blame and guilt, allowing the 
individual to engage in deviant behaviours. Additionally, the effect of negative attitudes 
towards authority on delinquent behaviours aligns with previous research that has found 
that anti-authority attitudes is predictive of delinquent behaviours in both men and 
women (Rigby et al., 1989; Tarry & Emler, 2007).  
 Beerthuizen and Brugman (2013) proposed that the importance individuals place 
on certain morals (i.e., moral value evaluation) would be activated before all other moral 
cognitions and would therefore act as an “influential elicitor” of other moral cognitions. 
Moral value evaluation is intuitive and reflects instinctual judgments that are later 
justified through moral reasoning. When an individual holds the belief that a certain 
moral value is important, that person is unlikely to engage in deviant behaviours that go 
against these personal values. This in turn protects the individual’s self-concept 
(Beerthuizen and Brugman, 2013), and avoids feelings of guilt or shame (Gibbs et al., 
2007). Thus, moral value evaluation acts almost as a gate, and dictates whether the 
current moral issue holds enough self-relevance or importance to “activate” other moral 
cognitions (i.e., moral reasoning, moral identity, and criminogenic cognition). The 
authors found support for the hypothesis, that moral value evaluation would be 
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completely mediated through other moral cognitions. The current study replicated 
Beerthuizen’s findings. That is, moral value evaluation had significant indirect effects on 
delinquent behaviours that were mediated through moral reasoning, moral identity, and 
criminogenic cognitions. Therefore, it appears that moral value evaluation is a promising 
component of moral cognitions and furthers our understanding how moral cognitions 
influence deviant behaviour.  
 Barriga et al. (2001) found that self-serving cognitive distortions partially 
mediated the association between moral reasoning and moral self-relevance (i.e., moral 
identity) on delinquent behaviours. The authors theorized that this is because mature 
moral judgment and high moral self-relevance discouraged the use of cognitive 
distortions. Further, the authors stated, “a profound understanding of the bases of moral 
values and a sense of commitment to moral virtues may deter one from distorting the 
facts of a social situation…” (p.554). However, the authors also acknowledged that 
individuals may still engage in self-serving cognitive distortions to rationalize deviant 
behaviours. This interpretation of this association makes intuitive sense; nonetheless, this 
mediation was not evident in the current study. 
As discussed previously, the lack of findings may be due to the potential for 
reported deviant behaviours to be historical in nature and not reflective of actions the 
participant would engage in currently. As such, some moral cognitions (i.e., moral value 
evaluation, moral reasoning, moral identity) may go through a maturation process 
between the time of the deviant behaviour and reporting said behaviour. Whereas, 
criminogenic cognitions may not be as influenced by development. This would account 
for why there is a direct effect of criminogenic cognitions on deviant behaviour but that 
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criminogenic cognitions do not mediate the association between moral reasoning and 
moral identity (which are now developmentally different from when the behaviour 
occurred).  
Correlations between Moral Cognitions and Sexually Coercive Behaviours 
Similar to those who engage in general delinquent behaviour, it is assumed that 
those who engage in sexually coercive behaviours exhibit more immature moral 
cognitions and endorse higher levels of criminogenic cognitions. The current study found 
an association between criminogenic cognitions and sexually coercive behaviours. That 
is, individuals who endorsed more criminogenic cognitions also self-reported engaging in 
more sexually coercive behaviours. This aligns with previous research, which has found 
that men who have been convicted of sexual offense hold attitudes that are supportive of 
sexually coercive behaviours (Beech, Fisher, & Ward, 2005; Polaschek & Gannon; 
2004). It appears that engaging in this distorted thinking may allow individuals to 
minimize, justify, and deny the negative impact of their sexually coercive behaviours 
have on others (Polaschek & Ward, 2002). However, the current study did not find an 
association between moral reasoning and sexually coercive behaviours. This is in contrast 
to previous research which has shown that those who have been convicted of sexual 
offences demonstrated lower levels of moral reasoning (Ashkar & Kenny, 2007). 
 It should be noted that there were several methodological differences between the 
current study and previous studies that found an association between sexually coercive 
behaviours and moral reasoning. For example, Ashkar and Kenny (2007) found that 
males convicted of sexual offences demonstrated lower levels of moral reasoning in 
sexual offending dilemmas when compared to nonsexual offenders. Yet, their study used 
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the Moral Judgment Interview, which is an in-person interview that presents participants 
with a series of moral dilemmas (Elm & Weber, 1994). Additionally, the participants 
were 16- to 19- year-old males who had been convicted of a sexual offense, whereas, the 
current study utilized an older sample that had not been convicted of a sexual offence. 
Within the current sample, less than 1% of the participants reported using physical harm 
to coercive a partner in sexual activity. The most frequently reported sexually coercive 
behaviours within the sample were persistent kissing/touching (10.6%) and repeatedly 
asking (9.8%). Although all sexually coercive behaviours should be condemned, on the 
continuum of sexually coercive behaviours, these actions might be considered less 
extreme than behaviours that involve physical restraint or aggression.  
This is not to say that persistent kissing, touching, and asking are not harmful to 
the victim but that the perpetrator may be unaware that they are engaging in sexually 
coercive behaviours. Whereas, physical force and threats to coercive a partner into sexual 
activity are more obvious violations of a partner’s right to determine whether or not to 
engage in sexual activity. Thus, if a perpetrator does not believe that they are engaging in 
an act that violates their partner’s autonomy, their moral cognitions may not be activated 
in the same way as when they engage in activities that society has deemed unacceptable 
(e.g., violent sexual assault). Thus, the association between moral reasoning and sexually 
coercive behaviours found by Ashkar and Kenny (2007) for their sample of adolescent 
males may be due, in part, to their participants engaging in sexual violence that clearly 
goes against social norms, whereas, the participants in the current sample of 
predominantly female young adults did not report engaging in such activities.  
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Direct and Indirect Effects Between Moral Cognitions and Sexually Coercive 
Behaviours 
Moral value evaluation, moral reasoning (specific to the moral domain of sex) 
moral identity and criminogenic cognitions (including adversarial heterosexual beliefs) 
were investigated in terms of their association to each other as well as their association to 
the outcome variable of sexually coercive behaviours.  Social desirability responding and 
hostile attitudes towards men and women were used as controls within the model. 
Overall, the fit of the model to the data was poor- to- good, which was an improvement 
upon the general delinquency model. This gives support to the notion that having moral 
cognitions specific to the delinquent behaviour (e.g., moral reasoning stage and moral 
value evaluations related to sexual issues when examining sexually coercive behaviours). 
 Given that no statistically significant associations between sexually coercive 
behaviours and moral cognitions were found in the correlation analysis, it was not 
surprising that this was replicated in the path analysis. More specifically, moral 
reasoning, moral identity and criminogenic cognitions were found to have no significant 
direct effect on sexually coercive behaviours. As previously discussed, this may be due to 
the low percentage of sexually coercive behaviours endorsed by the current study’s 
participants. 
 Interestingly and similar to the results of the general delinquency analyses, moral 
value evaluation was found to be completely mediated through moral identity, moral 
reasoning, and criminogenic cognitions. Thus, similar to the general delinquency model, 
it appears that moral value evaluation may act as an “influential elicitor” on moral 
cognitions related to sexually coercive behaviours. That is, an individual who deems 
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moral issues related to sexual violence and respecting the autonomy of others as 
important will demonstrate more mature moral reasoning in sexual moral domains, 
endorse more moral characteristics as self-relevant, and engage in few criminogenic 
cognitions, which in turn leads to less engagement in sexually coercive behaviours. Given 
the replication of Beerthuizen’s findings in both the general delinquency model as well as 
the sexually coercive behaviours model, moral value evaluation appears to be a very 
promising addition to models of moral cognitions and should be included in future 
research.   
 Recall that Barriga and Brugman (2001) found that criminogenic cognitions 
partially mediated the association between moral reasoning and moral identity on 
delinquent behaviours. This finding was partially replicated within the current study, with 
criminogenic cognitions mediating the association between moral identity on sexually 
coercive behaviours. This suggests that individuals who regard themselves as having 
higher moral characteristics were less likely to endorse criminogenic cognitions or, more 
specifically, attitudes that are supportive of sexually aggressive behaviours. However, the 
strength of this relation was relatively weak and individuals likely still engaged in 
criminogenic cognitions (although likely to a lesser extent) to “disengage” themselves 
from their sexually coercive behaviours.   
Moral Reasoning Measures: Production vs. Recognition 
Somewhat surprisingly, the current study found that the moral reasoning score on 
the SRM-SF and the moral reasoning score on the SRM-SFO were not significantly 
correlated with each other. Upon further inspection, only four of the moral reasoning 
questions were significantly correlated with each other (i.e., keeping a promise to a child, 
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saving a life of a friend, not stealing, and for a judge to send people to jail). There are 
several possibilities as to why score on the SRM-SFO were not predictive of scores on 
the SRM-SF. First, it may be that the multiple-choice answers on the SRM-SFO are no 
longer reflective of the answers individuals would give today. Recall that the multiple-
choice options provided in the SRM-SFO are based upon responses in Gibbs et al. (1992) 
work. Although Gibbs’ work and the creation of the SRM-SF was instrumental in moving 
the field of moral reasoning forward, the 27-year-old responses may no longer be 
reflective of the modern thought processes. 
 Given that some of these answers may no longer be reflective of what an 
individual would choose, participants may just select the options that “sounds the best” or 
appears to be mature. Even though participants have the option to choose that none of the 
answers are reflective of what they think, a cursory look into the data demonstrates that 
this is not a typically chosen response. Thus, it may be advantageous for researchers to 
gather more current responses to the moral situations created by Gibbs et al. (1992). If 
participants see answers that are more reflective of their true responses, they may be 
more likely to choose this one choice, instead of selecting multiple reasons.  
Secondly, the lack of association between the two measures may be due to the 
lack of detailed responses in the production portion of the SRM-SF. In comparison with 
the answers provided in the SRM-SF manual, qualitative answers provided by 
participants in the current study were shorter, less detailed and demonstrated less thought 
process than exemplars provided in the manual. Additionally, there was also only 
moderate agreement between raters, whereas, in Barriga’s et. (2001) study inter-rater 
agreement was high (i.e., r(20) = .81, p <. 001).  This may be due to the current study 
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being completed online, whereas, previous research has administered the SRM-SF in 
person. The difference of environment, (i.e., in a classroom setting or at home) may have 
impacted the level of detailed provided. In a classroom-like environment, writing and 
putting forth effort in work is expected.  At home the environment may be more leisurely 
and the participant may not put forth as much effort. Thus, it may be that the current 
studies participants did not put as much effort into their answers as participants in 
previous research.  
 Even though the answers within the current study were codable, individuals may 
have not given enough detail in their responses to demonstrate the “true” maturity of their 
moral reasoning. This in turn would artificially lower their moral reasoning level. In the 
SRM-SFO individuals are able to quickly select which answers are reflective of their own 
reasoning, requiring less effort from the participant. As such, it is possible that the SRM-
SFO moral reasoning responses are more reflective of participant’s moral reasoning. This 
may also explain why the moral reasoning score in the SRM-SFO were higher (and 
within the mature stage range) than the SRM-SF moral reasoning scores (which fell just 
below the mature stage range). Thus, future research should consider systematically 
investigating the potential impact of administration setting/medium on SRM-SF scores.  
Given the detail of the responses needed, researchers could encourage participants to 
continue writing when short responses are provided. Additionally, the social pressure of 
seeing other participants write substantial answers may encourage others to continue to 
writing.  
Although the current study was unable to confirm the validity of the SRM-SFO, 
the measure still demonstrated promise, as there were small to moderate correlations on 
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five of the ten original items. Additionally, as discussed above, the moderate inter-rater 
agreement on the SRM-SF was substantially lower than previous research (e.g., Barriga 
et al., 2001), which suggests that the current answers provided on the SRM-SF by the 
current study may not be of the same high quality as in Barriga’s study. Thus, the current 
results should be interpreted with some restraint. The utility of having a moral reasoning 
recognition measure is substantial; as the complexity of analyses required to adequately 
investigate moral cognitions increases (which requires large sample sizes) and research 
continues to move to an online format, the use of the SRM-SF may become less and less 
practical. Thus, continued work on the SRM-SFO would be extremely advantageous to 
the field of moral psychology.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
 Though the current study expands our understanding of association between 
moral cognitions as well as their association with anti-social behaviours, there are some 
limitations of the current study that should be addressed. First, due to the correlational 
nature of the data, causation cannot be inferred. In order to claim causal effect, all other 
explanations of the association must be ruled out (Field, 2009). This of course, was not 
possible and it is quite plausible that the associations found in the current study were due 
to outside confounding variables. Even though there is strong theoretical reasoning to 
suspect a causal association between moral cognitions and antisocial behaviours, one 
must remember that correlation does not equal causation. Secondly, a larger sample of 
participants would have been advantageous. The path analyses used in the current study 
were underpowered and thus weaker associations between certain variables of interest 
may have gone undetected. Similarly, the smaller sample size may have affected the 
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results of the partial and bivariate correlations. This may have played a role in the failure 
to replicate all of Barriga’s and Beerthuizen’s findings in their analyses.  Additionally, a 
larger sample may have allowed for more instances of delinquent behaviours and self-
reported sexually coercive behaviours. Therefore, it is suggested that future research have 
adequate power for the purpose.  
 Another limitation to note was the decision to use a retrospective delinquency 
measure that did not specify a time-frame in which the antisocial activity should have 
taken place. As previously discussed, it is possible that participants were reporting 
delinquent behaviour from several years ago. Given the potential time lapse between 
committing the delinquent act and the participant having their moral cognitions 
measured, it is possible that these cognitions went through some developmental 
maturation. This would mean that the present moral cognitions are no longer reflective of 
the moral cognitions used at the time the individual chose to engage in the delinquent 
behaviour. Thus, future research, particularly research using adult participants, should use 
a delinquency measure that specifies a time-frame in which the activities occur.  
 Another limitation of the current study was the moderate (Altman, 1990; Landis 
& Koch, 1977) inter-rater agreement on the SRM-SF. As previously discussed, the 
overall quality of the qualitative responses provided on the SRM-SF was poor, which 
may have accounted for the lower inter-rater agreement. This highlights the challenges of 
using a production measure to measure moral reasoning. It is highly dependent on the 
effort participants are willing to put forth in answering each question. Furthermore, even 
though both raters relied on the manual (Gibbs et al., 1992) to code participant responses, 
it is possible that more time was required than the two months that was dedicated to 
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coding the SRM-SF in the current study. Thus, future research should be aware that this 
measure will be heavily time consuming. Within the current study, after an explanation of 
how to use the manual and a cross check of a small subset of coding of participants 
responses, both raters coded completely independently. The two raters of the current 
study did not discuss and come to a collective agreement on responses that the raters had 
a disagreement on. Thus, it may be beneficial for coders to spend more time collectively 
coding answers to produce higher inter-rater agreement.  
 Future research should also consider exploring the developmental trajectory of 
moral cognitions. Although it has been well researched that moral reasoning is influenced 
by development (e.g., Kohlberg, 1981). It is less clear as to whether other moral 
cognitions (i.e., moral value evaluation, moral identity, and criminogenic cognitions) are 
influenced by development to the same degree as moral reasoning (or if at all). If these 
cognitions are influenced by maturation, what would this influence look like? Would 
issues considered important and morally relevant in moral value evaluation change or 
remain static? As individuals age, would they identify more with moral characteristics? It 
would be possible to answer these questions (and others) through a longitudinal or cross-
sectional design. This study would help further our understanding on the association 
between moral cognitions, behaviours, and the impact of maturation (and potentially life 
experience) on these cognitions.  
Conclusion  
 The question of why individuals engage in deviant behaviours has been a topic of 
interest in psychology for many years (e.g., Gluek & Gluek, 1940). Researchers have 
examined moral value evaluation (e.g., Beerthuizen and Brugman, 2013), moral 
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reasoning (e.g., Kohlbeg, 1981), moral identity (e.g., Barriga et al., 2001), and 
criminogenic cognitions (e.g., Tangney et al., 2012) in an attempt to understand how they 
influence antisocial behaviours. Barriga et al. (2001) proposed a multi-process cognitive 
developmental model that predicted not only these moral cognitions in association to 
deviant behaviours but also in association to each other. As such, the primary goal of the 
current study was to replicate and extend Barriga’s model. The current study examined 
moral value evaluation (an addition contributed by Beerthuizen and Brugman, 2013), 
moral reasoning by specific moral domain (e.g., moral domain of sex) and used updated 
measures (i.e., moral identity) that did not rely on behavioural context (i.e., criminogenic 
cognitions). The second goal of the current study was to gain insight into the validity of 
the new recognition measure, the SRM-SFO (Basinger et al., 2007) by comparing it to 
the SRM-SF (Gibbs et al., 1992). 
 Even though not all of Barriga’s et al., (2001) or Beerthuizen and Brugman’s 
(2013) findings were replicated, the current study contributed several important findings 
and implications. First, the implication of the importance of having a delinquency 
measure that uses relatively recent antisocial activities became apparent within this study. 
This is important, as the vast majority of moral reasoning research use similar measures 
to the one utilized within the current study. Secondly, the finding that criminogenic 
cognitions were not dependent on behavioural contexts (as they had been in previous 
research) had a direct effect on general delinquency. This means that the one can have 
more confidence that the association between criminogenic cognitions and antisocial 
behaviour is not due to measurement contamination. Additionally, moral value 
evaluation, moral reasoning, and moral identity were mediated through criminogenic 
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cognitions for both general delinquency and sexually coercive behaviours. Finally, the 
current study provided strong support for the inclusion of moral value evaluation as an 
“elicitor” of moral cognitions, as it was completely mediated through moral reasoning, 
moral identity, and criminogenic cognitions for both the general delinquency model and 
the sexually coercive behaviours. Thus, the current study furthers our understanding of 
moral cognitions and their association to not only general delinquency but sexually 
coercive behaviours as well.  
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APPENDIX A 
Delinquent Activities Scale (Revised) 
Have you done any of the following activities?   
  Have you done 
this activity? 
If Yes, Please Select 
Frequency 
       
1 Stolen (or tried to steal) a motor vehicle, such as a car 
or motorcycle.  
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
2 Stolen (or tried to steal) something worth more than 
$50. 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
3 Knowingly bought, stole, or held stolen goods (or tried 
to do any of these things). 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
4 Carried a hidden weapon other than a plain 
pocketknife. 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
5 Stolen (or tried to steal) something worth $50 or less. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
6 Attacked someone with the idea of seriously hurting or 
killing him/her. 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
7 Been paid for having sexual relations with someone. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
8 Been involved in gang fights. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
9 Sold marijuana or hashish (pot, grass, hash). No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
10 Hit (or threatened to hit) an adult. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
11 Hit (or threatened to hit) other peers. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
12 Been loud, rowdy or unruly in a public place 
(disorderly conduct). 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
13 Sold cocaine or crack.  No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
14 Sold hard drugs such as heroin or LSD. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
15 Taken a vehicle for a ride (drive) without the owner’s 
permission. 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
MORAL COGNITIONS AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
108  
 
16 Had (or tried to have) sexual relations with someone 
against their will. 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
17 Used force (strong-arm methods) to get money or 
things from other peers. 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
18 Used force (strong-arm methods) to get money or 
things from an adult. 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
19 Broke into a building or vehicle (or tried to break in) 
to steal something or just look around. 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
20 Begged for money or things from strangers. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
21 Was arrested. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
22 Bullied, threatened or intimidated others. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
23 Initiated physical fights. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
24 Used a weapon (bat, brick, broken bottle, knife, gun). No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
25 Been physically cruel to animals. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
26 Been physically cruel to people.  No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
27 Set fires with the intention of causing serious damage. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
28 Destroyed others’ property on purpose (not by fire 
setting). 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
29 Lied to obtain goods or favors or to avoid obligations 
(cons others). 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
30 Stayed out at night despite house rules not to. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
31 Ran away from home overnight. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
32 Skipped school. No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
33 Could not pay bills (loans, child support, etc.). No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
34 Done something (left school, a job, etc.) before 
thinking of what might happen if you did it (had no 
other plans). 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
35 Got in trouble at work, was late for work, or missed 
work. 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
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36 Engaging in activities that could be dangerous to 
yourself or others (speeding, etc.). 
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
37. Made threatening or harassing phone calls No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
38. Refused to provide an animal with needed food, water, 
or shelter  
No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
39.  Threatened, scared, intimidated, or bullied an animal No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
40. Entered an animal into a fight with another animal No Yes 0-1 2-4 5 or more 
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APPENDIX B 
Postrefusal Sexual Persistence Scale 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to look at the different tactics people use on other 
individuals to have sexual contact with them, when those individuals have already said no to 
their advances.  
When answering the question to each item, please indicate either “yes” or “no”.    
Since the age of 14 have you ever a used any of the tactics on the list below to have sexual 
contact with a male/female after they have indicated ‘no’ to your sexual advances?  
 
Tactics Perpetrated the Tactic 
Sexual Arousal            
Persistent kissing and touching Yes         No 
Perpetrator taking off own clothes Yes         No 
Perpetrator taking off target’s clothes Yes         No 
           
Emotional Manipulation and Deception           
Repeatedly asking Yes         No 
Telling lies Yes         No 
Using authority of older age Yes         No 
Questionings target’s sexuality Yes         No 
Threatening to break up Yes         No 
Using authority of position Yes         No 
Threatening self-harm Yes         No 
Threatening blackmail Yes         No 
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Exploitation of the intoxicated           
Taking advantage of the intoxicated Yes         No 
Purposely getting a target drunk Yes         No 
          
Physical force, threats, harm           
Blocking target’s retreat Yes         No 
Using physical restraint Yes         No 
Using physical harm Yes         No 
Threatening physical behaviour Yes         No 
Tying up the target Yes         No 
Threatening with a weapon Yes         No 
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APPENDIX C 
Social Reflection Questionnaire 
Instructions  
In this questionnaire, we want to find out about the things you think are important for 
people to do, and especially why you think these things (like keeping a promise) are 
important. Please try to help us understand your thinking by WRITING AS MUCH AS 
YOU CAN TO EXPLAIN- EVEN IF YOU HAVE TO WRITE OUT YOUR 
EXPLANATIONS MORE THAN ONCE. Don’t just write “same as before.” If you can 
explain better or use different words to show what you mean, that helps us even more. 
Please answer all the questions, especially the “why” questions.  
1. Think about when you’ve made a promise to a friend of yours. How important is it 
for people to keep promises, if they can, to friends?  
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)?  
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2. What about keeping a promise to anyone? How Important is it for people to keep 
promises, if they can, even to someone they hardly know?  
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. How about keeping a promise to a child? How important is it for parents to keep 
promises, if they can, to their children? 
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
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4. In general, how important is it for people to tell the truth?  
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Think about when you’ve helped your mother or father. How important is it for 
children to help their parents?  
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
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6. Let’s say a friend of yours needs help and may even die, and you’re the only person 
who can save him or her. How important is it for a person (without losing his or her 
own life) to save the life of a friend?  
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
 
 
 
 
 
7. What about saving the life of anyone? How important is it for a person (without 
losing his or her own life) to save the life of a stranger?  
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
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8. How important is it for a person to live even if that person don’t want to?  
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
 
 
 
 
 
9. How important is it for people not to take things that belong to other people?  
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
MORAL COGNITIONS AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
117  
 
10. How important is it for people to obey the law?  
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
 
 
 
 
 
11. How Important is it for judges to send people who break the law to jail? 
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
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12.  How important is it that people are not allowed to force others into having sex? 
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
 
 
 
 
 
13. How important is it that victims of sexual abuse receive help? 
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
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14. How important is it that rapists are being punished?  
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Imagine two people kissing. How important is it that someone stops kissing if the 
other person says no?  
 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Why is that very important/Important/Not Important (whichever one you circled)? 
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APPENDIX D 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form Objective 
Instructions  
In this questionnaire, we want to find out about the things that you think are important for people 
to do and especially why you think these things (like keeping a promise) are important. Please try 
to help us understand your thinking by choosing the answers that best match how you think. Also, 
please answer each question  
Example  
I.  
How important is it to eat 
healthy, do you think? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
II. If you had to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT to eat healthy, 
what reason would you give? For each statement below, select is close 
or not close to your thinking. If the reason is too hard to understand, 
then just cross ‘not sure.’  
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because else you would become ill. i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because your parents would like you to 
eat healthy. 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because you will get old.  i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because earing healthy help to live in a 
healthy milieu 
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would 
give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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1. Think about when you’ve made a promise to a friend  
 
I.  
How 
important is 
it for people 
to keep 
promises, if 
they can, to 
a friend? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
II. If you had to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT to keep a promise to 
a friend if you can, what reason would you give? 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because your friend may have 
done things for you, and you 
need friends  
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because friendships as well as 
society must be based on trust 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because otherwise that person 
won’t be your friend again 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because otherwise you would 
lose trust in each other  
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
 
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would 
give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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2. What about keeping a promise to a person you hardly know?  
 
I.  
How important 
is it for people 
to keep 
promises if 
they can, even 
to someone 
they hardly 
know? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
II. If you has to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT to keep a promise to 
a person you hardly know, what reason would you give? 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because otherwise the person 
will find out and beat you up 
or do something bad to you.  
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because then you can feel 
good about yourself and keep 
from giving the impression 
that you are a selfish person 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because it is important for the 
sake of your own integrity as 
well as the respect of others  
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because you might just run 
into that person again some tie  
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would 
give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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3. How about keeping a promise to a child?  
I.  
How 
important is 
it for people 
to keep 
promises if 
they can, to 
their 
children? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
II. If you has to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT for parents to keep 
promises to their children, what reason would you give? 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because parents want their 
children to keep promises, so 
parents should keep promises 
too.   
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because parents should never 
break promises 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because children must 
understand the importance of 
reliability or consistency 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because otherwise the children 
would lose faith in their 
parents 
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
 
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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4. What do you think about telling the truth?  
I.  
In general, 
how 
important it 
for people is 
to tell the 
truth? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
II. If you has to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT for people to tell the truth 
what reason would you give? 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because people should always 
tell the truth   
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because honestly is the best 
policy 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because lies catch up to you 
sooner or later 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because honesty is a standard 
that everyone can accept 
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
 
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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5. Think about when you’ve helped your mother or father.  
I.  
How 
important is 
it for 
children to 
help their 
parents? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
II. If you has to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT for children to help their 
parents; what reason would you give? 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because parents help their 
children, so children should 
help their parents   
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because it’s nice for children 
to help their parents 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because that is what a family 
is all about 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because parents sacrifice so 
much for their children 
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
 
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
  
MORAL COGNITIONS AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
126  
 
6. What is a friend needs help and may even die, and you’re the only person who 
can save him or her?  
I.  
How important 
is it for a 
person 
(without losing 
his or her own 
life) to save the 
life of a friend? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
II. If you had to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT for a person to save the 
life of a friend; what reason would you give? 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because it’s your friend, who 
might be an important person   
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because you would feel close 
to your friend, and would 
expect that your friend would 
help you 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because the friend may have 
done things for you, so you 
should do a favor for the 
friend, if you want your friend 
to help you in the future 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because a friendship must be 
based on mutual respect and 
cooperation 
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
 
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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7. What about saving the life of a stranger?  
I.  
How 
important is 
it for a 
person 
(without 
losing 
his/her own 
life) to save 
the life of a 
stranger? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
II. If you had to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT for a person to save the 
life of a stranger; what reason would you give? 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because the stranger is a 
person who wants to live   
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because you should always 
be nice 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because people must help 
each other 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because life is precious and it 
is inhuman to let anyone 
suffer 
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
 
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D 
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8. People are not allowed to take away things that belong to others 
 
I.  
How 
important is 
it for people 
not to take 
things that 
belong to 
other 
people? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
II. If you had to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT for people not to take 
things that belong to other people; what reason would you give? 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because stealing gets you 
nowhere, and you are taking 
too much of a risk    
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because it is selfish and 
heartless to steal from others 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because living in society 
means accepting obligations 
and not only benefits 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because stealing is bad, and 
you will go to jail if you steal  
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
 
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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9. People have to obey the law.  
I.  
How 
important is 
it for people 
to obey the 
law? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
II. If you had to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT for people to obey the 
law; what reason would you give? 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because the law is there to 
follow, and people should 
always obey it    
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because otherwise everyone 
will be stealing from everyone 
else and nothing will be left 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because otherwise the world 
would go crazy, and there 
would be chaos 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because laws make society 
possible, and otherwise the 
system would break down  
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
 
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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10. What should a judge do with someone who breaks the law?  
 
I.  
How 
important is 
it for judges 
to send 
people who 
break the 
law to jail? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
II. If you had to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT for judges to send people 
who break the law to jail, what reason would you give? 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because if they take the risk 
and get caught, then they go to 
jail    
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because they must have 
known that what they did was 
wrong 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because otherwise the world 
would go because they must 
be prepared to be held 
accountable for their actions  
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because they did something 
wrong and judges should never 
let them go free  
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
 
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D 
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11. People are not allowed to force others into having sex.  
I.  
How important 
is it that people 
are not allowed 
to force others 
into having sex? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
II. If you had to give a reason WHY it is IMPORTANT (at least sometimes) that 
people are not allowed to force others into having sex, what reason would you 
give?  
 
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because in a society you have 
to respect other people’s 
rights, including whether or 
not to have intimate relations 
with someone    
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because forcing people to 
have sex may cause more 
problems than pleasure 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because otherwise the other 
person will turn you in and 
you will go to jail  
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because it is hard to imagine a 
more selfish or indecent 
person than a rapist  
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
 
III.  Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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12. Should victims of sexual abuse receive help? 
I.  
How important is it that 
victims of sexual abuse 
receive help? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
II. If you had to give a reason WHY it is important that victims of sexual abuse 
receive help, what reason would you give?  
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because the victim is a person who needs 
help 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because helping them in the nice thing to 
do 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because people must help one another  i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because the person is valuable and it is 
inhuman to let anyone suffer 
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would 
give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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13. People who commit a rape should be punished. 
I.  
How important is it that 
rapists are being punished? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
II. If you had to give a reason WHY it is important that rapists are being 
punished, what reason would you give?  
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because if they do the crime they should 
do the time 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because they should know that what they 
did was wrong 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because otherwise other people would 
think that they can commit rape and there 
would be chaos 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because punishment is a deterrent and 
keeps other people safe from being 
victims, without punishment the system 
would break down.   
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
III. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would 
give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D  
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14. Imagine two people are kissing.  
How important is it that 
someone stops kissing if 
the other person says no? 
Not 
important 
  Important   Very 
Important 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I. If you had to give a reason WHY it is important that someone stops kissing 
if the other person says no, what reason would you give?  
 Is this close to a reason you would 
give? 
A) Because forcing someone to kiss you will 
cause more issues than it is worth 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
B) Because it is hard to picture a more 
indecent person than someone who 
makes others kiss them 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
C) Because in society you have to respect 
another’s autonomy, including whether 
or not to kiss you 
i. Yes  
ii. No  
iii. Not sure 
D) Because they may tell other people that 
you forced them to kiss you 
i. Yes  
ii. No 
iii. Not Sure  
II. Of the reasons given, which one is the closest to the reason you would 
give?  
i. A  
ii. B 
iii. C 
iv. D   
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APPENDIX E 
 
The Self-Importance of Moral Identity Measure 
 
Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person  
 
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest and 
Kind 
 
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a 
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine 
how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this 
person would be life, answer the following questions  
 
 
  Strongly 
disagree 
   Strongly 
agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1.It would make me feel good to be a person 
who has these characteristics 
      
2.Being someone who has these characteristics is 
an important part of who I am  
      
3.I would be ashamed to be a person who has 
these characteristics (R) 
      
4.Having these characteristics is not really 
important to me (R) 
      
5.I strongly desire to have these characteristics        
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APPENDIX F 
Criminogenic Cognitions Scale 
For the next set of statements, please indicate how well this describes your current thinking, using the following scale:     
  1= Strongly Disagree       2= Disagree       3= Agree       4= Strongly Agree 
A few questions have an additional option of "N/A," which is used to indicate that the phrase is not applicable to your situation. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. When I want something, I expect people 
to deliver.  
1 2 3 4  
2. Bad childhood experiences are partly to 
blame for my current situation. 
1 2 3 4  
3. The future is unpredictable and there is no 
point planning for it. 
1 2 3 4  
4. My crime(s) did not really harm anyone. 1 2 3 4 NA, I’ve never 
committed any acts 
that could be 
considered criminal 
5.  I feel like what happens in my life is 
mostly determined by powerful people. 
1 2 3 4  
6. I will never be satisfied until I get all that I 
deserve.  
1 2 3 4  
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7. A theft is all right as long as the victim is 
not physically injured. 
1 2 3 4  
8. Even though I got caught, it was still 
worth the risk.   
1 2 3 4 NA, I’ve never been 
caught for any 
behaviors that could 
be considered 
criminal 
9. If you are reading this item, click 1 1 2 3 4  
10. Because of my history I get blamed for a 
lot of things I did not do. 
1 2 3 4  
11. Most of the laws are good. 1 2 3 4  
12. Victims of crime usually get over it with 
time. 
1 2 3 4  
13. When you commit a crime the only one 
affected is the victim. 
1 2 3 4  
14. Most police officers/guards abuse their 
power. 
1 2 3 4  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
14. Society makes too big of a deal about my 
crime(s). 
1 2 3 4 NA, I’ve never 
committed any acts 
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that could be 
considered criminal 
15. Sometimes I cannot control myself. 1 2 3 4  
16. I expect people to treat me better than 
other people. 
1 2 3 4  
17. People in authority are usually looking 
out for my best interest. 
1 2 3 4  
18. Why plan to save for something if you 
can have it now. 
1 2 3 4  
19. I insist on getting the respect that is due 
to me. 
1 2 3 4  
20. If a police officer/guard tells me to do 
something, there’s usually a good reason for 
it. 
1 2 3 4  
21.  People in positions of authority 
generally take advantage of others. 
1 2 3 4  
22. I am just a “born criminal.” 1 2 3 4  
23. I deserve more than other people. 1 2 3 4  
24. I think it is better to enjoy today than 
worry about tomorrow. 
1 2 3 4  
25. I do not like to be tied down to a regular 
work schedule. 
1 2 3 4  
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APPENDIX G 
Adversarial Beliefs Scale (ABS) 
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements. Remember that all your 
answers will be kept confidential so please be as honest as you can. 
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
  
N
eu
tra
l  
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
Ag
re
e 
1. In dating relationships people are mostly out to take 
advantage of each other. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. If you don’t show who’s boss in the beginning of a 
relationship you will be taken advantage of later. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Most people are pretty devious and manipulative 
when they are trying to attract a potential 
romantic/sexual partner. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Men and women are generally out to use each 
other. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. It’s impossible for men and women to truly 
understand each other. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. In the work force any gain by one sex necessitates 
a loss for the other. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. When women enter the work force they are taking 
jobs away from men. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. If you are reading this item, click 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Men and women cannot really be friends. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Sex is like a game where one person “wins” and 
the other “loses.” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. In all societies it is inevitable that one sex is 
dominant. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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12. It is natural for one spouse to be in control of the 
other. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. When it comes to sex, most people are just trying 
to use the other person. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
*14. It is possible for the sexes to be equal in society. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
*15. Men and women share more similarities than 
differences.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
*16. It is possible for a man and a woman to be “just 
friends.” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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 APPENDIX H 
Hostility Toward Women Scale 
Read each statement and circle the one number that best describes you. 
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
  
N
eu
tra
l  
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
Ag
re
e 
1. I feel that many times women flirt with men just to 
tease them or hurt them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I believe that most women tell the truth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. If you are reading this item, click 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I usually find myself agreeing with (other) women. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I think that most women would lie just to get ahead. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Generally, it is safer not to trust women. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. When it really comes down to it, a lot of women are 
deceitful. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I am easily angered by (other) women. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I am sure I get a raw deal from the (other) women 
in my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Sometimes (other) women bother me by just being 
around. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. (Other) Women are responsible for most of my 
troubles. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX I 
Hostility Toward Men Scale 
Read each statement and circle the one number that best describes you. 
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
  
N
eu
tra
l  
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
Ag
re
e 
1. I feel that many times men flirt with women just to 
tease them or hurt them. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I believe that most men tell the truth. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I usually find myself agreeing with (other) men. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I think that most men would lie just to get ahead. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Generally, it is safer not to trust men. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. When it really comes down to it, a lot of men are 
deceitful. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I am easily angered by (other) men. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I am sure I get a raw deal from the (other) men in 
my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Sometimes (other) men bother me by just being 
around. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. (Other) Men are responsible for most of my 
troubles. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX J 
General Background 
Please complete the following information by filling in the blanks and circling the letter for each 
question that corresponds with the correct/best response for you. If you are unsure of the answer 
to a question, please give it your best guess.  
1. How old are you? _____ / _____ (years / months)  
2. What gender do you identify as?  
a) Female 
b) Male 
OR 
c) Nonbinary (please describe in your own words): ____________________________ 
3. What is your year of study? 
a) In year 1 
b) In year 2 
c) In year 3 
d) In year 4 
e) Other (please describe): ____________________________ 
4. What is your ethnicity?  
a) White 
b) South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.) 
c) Chinese 
d) Black 
e) Filipino 
f) Latin American 
g) Arab 
h) Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, Thai, etc)  
i) West Asian (e.g., Iranian, Afghan, etc.) 
j) Korean 
k) Japanese 
l) Other (please describe): __________  
5. What is your sexual orientation?  
a) Heterosexual  
b) Homosexual 
c) Bisexual 
d) Pansexual  
e) Asexual 
f) Other (please describe in your own words):          
6. What is your current relationship status?  
a) Single – not dating exclusively  
b) Single – dating exclusively  
c) Living with a partner  
d) Engaged  
e) Married  
f) Separated  
g) Divorced  
h) Widowed  
i) Other (please describe in your own words): __________  
7. How long has this been your relationship status? 
a) Less than three months  
b) Three months to dix months 
c) Six months to less than one year 
d) One year to less than two years 
e) Two years to less than five  
f) Five years or more  
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APPENDIX K 
BIDR-16  
 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how 
true it is. 
 
 
 + + + + + + + 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 not true   somewhat   very true 
 
 
____  1. I have not always been honest with myself. 
 
____  2. I always know why I like things. 
 
____ 3. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
 
____ 4. I never regret my decisions. 
 
____ 5. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough. 
 
____ 6. I am a completely rational person. 
 
____ 7. I am very confident of my judgments 
 
____ 8. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
 
____ 9. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
 
____ 10. I never cover up my mistakes. 
 
____ 11. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
 
____ 12. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
 
____ 13. I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back. 
 
____ 14. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
 
____ 15. I never take things that don't belong to me. 
 
____ 16. I don't gossip about other people's business 
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APPENDIX L 
Consent to participate in research 
  
Title of Study: Thinking things through: What do attitudes and reasoning have to do with 
types of delinquency? 
  
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Sarah Gardiner under the 
supervision of Dr. Calvin Langton, from the Department of Psychology at the University 
of Windsor. If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to 
contact Sarah Gardiner at gari111@uwindsor.ca or Dr. Calvin Langton at 
clangton@uwindsor.ca. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of this study is to understand more about the relationships between people’s 
moral reasoning, their attitudes about delinquent behaviours and about sexual activities 
(including unwanted sexual experiences), as well as their involvement in delinquent 
behaviours and unwanted sexual activities.   
 
PROCEDURES 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to provide demographic 
information and complete questionnaires that will ask about your personality, your 
opinions and attitudes about other people, about types of delinquent and criminal 
behaviours, and your involvement in types of delinquent behaviour as well as sexual 
activities that may have been unwanted. There is also a brief set of very basic math and 
English questions to help us understand types of responding. Some of the questionnaires 
include questions about various moral dilemmas or ask you to briefly explain (by typing 
sentences) your thinking about these moral dilemmas. Completion of the online surveys 
will take no longer than 60 minutes. 
  
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
One possible adverse effect of participation is the experience of fatigue and/or boredom 
given the general nature of the activity. Additionally, some of the items in the self-report 
measures concern sexually coercive behaviours, criminal activity, and hostile attitudes. 
Some of the items in the measures of moral reasoning pose challenging and potentially 
emotionally troubling dilemmas. The instruments are standardized tools and the language 
cannot be changed without affecting the reliability and validity of the scale,but it is not 
necessarily language endorsed by the researchers. It is possible that you may become 
distressed at recollecting experiences or reflecting about yourself or when pondering 
some of these moral dilemmas. 
You can skip any questions for which you do not wish to provide a response. Further, you 
can stop your participation and withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. 
Another possible concern you might have is about the confidentiality of your 
participation and responses. No information will be collected that would be specific 
enough to ‘trigger’ a duty to report anything to anyone. All participants’ data will be 
anonymized once the Participant Pool participation bonus points have been awarded and 
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the final date for withdrawal has elapsed. Appropriate measures will be taken to ensure 
the confidentiality of the data at all stages of the project (see below). Importantly, we 
strongly encourage you to complete the online survey in a private location (such as your 
home) and you should delete the browser history and clear the cache of the computer 
used once you have submitted your full set of responses.   
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
There is no direct benefit of completing this study, but when completing these measures, 
you may gain some insight into yourself. 
 
COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION 
 This study will take no more than 60 minutes of your time and is worth 1 bonus points if 
you are registered in the pool and you are registered in one or more eligible courses. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified 
with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. Your 
identifying information needs to be recorded in order to allocate Participant Pool 
participation bonus points. Your identifying information will be kept separate from the 
data collected for the study that will be analyzed by us. Any identifying information that 
is collected will be deleted once bonus points have been awarded and the final date for 
withdrawal has elapsed. All electronic data will be deidentified and saved on password-
protected computers belonging to us. Direct quotes may be used in one or more 
manuscripts, edited books, one or more posters, oral presentations at conferences, or 
other works. No identifying information will be revealed in any selected quotes. The 
anonymized data will be kept on password-protected computers belonging to us for a 
minimum of 5 years after the last publication associated with this data set has been 
published. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
You may stop your participation in the study at any time by closing your web browser. 
You may withdraw your data from the study by emailing your request to the principal 
investigator (Sarah Gardiner) at any time up to the end of the semester in which you 
participated in the study. After this time, the data will be retrieved from the online survey 
site and anonymized, so withdrawal will no longer be possible after this date. The 
investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant 
doing so. 
Compensation will correspond with the proportion of the study completed. Full credit of 
1 bonus point for the online session will be given to participants who complete 90% of 
the total items comprising the self-report measures in the session. Careful consideration 
will be given to cases in which the participant completes less than 90% of the items in 
order to ensure that commensurate partial credit is awarded. 
  
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS 
The study results will be posted to the University of Windsor REB website as soon as 
they are available. It is not anticipated that the results will be available until Fall 2020. 
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SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
The data will be used in analyses in one or more manuscripts for submission to peer 
reviewed journals or edited books, and one or more posters or oral presentations at 
conferences. 
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact:  Research 
Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-
253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:  ethics@uwindsor.ca 
  
Services/Resources  
If you’re having any emotional or psychological difficulties after participating in this 
study, it is important to access resources that are available to you, some of which are on 
campus. 
For help addressing mental health concerns, contact: (519) 253-3000:Student Counselling 
Centre at ext. 4616Psychological Services Centre, University of Windsor at ext. 7012 
Peer Support Centre at ext. 4551Another resource is Good2Talk, a 24/7 helpline for 
Ontario college and university students (not affiliated with University of Windsor): 1-
866-925-5454. 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE  
I understand the information provided for the study Thinking things through: What do 
attitudes and reasoning have to do with types of delinquency as described herein.   I have 
had an opportunity to email any questions I might have about the study to the 
investigator. I have been given the opportunity to print this form. By clicking “I Agree” I 
am giving consent to participate in this study.  
  
Please remember to print out a copy of this consent form for yourself. 
  
  
  
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
  
These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
  
 
                                                                                                        July 20th, 2018 
Signature of Investigator                                                                     Date 
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